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User: CRY STAL

Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County

Time: 01 :31 PM

ROA Report
Case: CV-2014-0000784 Current Judge: Robert J. Elgee

Susan Jane Warner vs. State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation
Susan Jane Warner vs. State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation

Other Claims
Judge

Date
New Case Filed - Other Claims

Robert J. Elgee

Plaintiff: Warner, Susan Jane Appearance Andrew Parnes

Robert J. Elgee

Filing: L3 - Appeal or petition for judicial review or cross appeal or
cross-petition from commission, board, or body to district court Paid by:
Andrew Parnes Receipt number: 0007172 Dated: 12/4/2014 Amount:
$221.00 (Check) For: Warner, Susan Jane (plaintiff)

Robert J. Elgee

Petition for Judicial Review

Robert J. Elgee

Order Staying License Suspension and Setting Show Cause Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause 12/15/2014 09:30 AM)

Robert J. Elgee

Procedural Order Governing Judicial Review of Agency Action By District
Court

Robert J. Elgee

Defendant: State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation Appearance
Timothy J. Stover

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of Appearance

Robert J. Elgee

Notice of Non-Objection to Order Staying License Suspension

Robert J. Elgee

12/15/2014

Hearing result for Order to Show Cause scheduled on 12/15/2014 09:30
AM: Hearing Vacated

Robert J. Elgee

12/17/2014

Notice of Lodging of Agency Record

Robert J. Elgee

12/23/2014

Notice of Court Reporter's Estimate

Robert J. Elgee

12/31/2014

Notice of Filing Agency Record

Robert J. Elgee

Lodged/Agency Record

Robert J. Elgee

1/20/2015

Notice of Filing Transcript

Robert J. Elgee

2/24/2015

Amended Notice of Filing Agency Record

Robert J. Elgee

12/4/2014

12/10/2014

Lodged/Amended Agency Record

Robert J. Elgee

3/3/2015

Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review

Robert J. Elgee

3/30/2015

Respondent's Brief

Robert J. Elgee

4/3/2015

Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review

Robert J. Elgee

4/7/2015

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 05/04/2015 11 :00 AM) oral
argument

Robert J. Elgee

Notice of Oral Argument

Robert J. Elgee

4/22/2015

Respondent's Augmentation of Brief

Robert J. Elgee

5/4/2015

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled
Hearing date: 5/4/2015
Time: 10:59 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation, Attorney: Timothy
Stover
Party: Susan Lauer, Attorney: Andrew Parnes

Robert J. Elgee

Date: 10/1/2015

Fifth Judicial District Court - Blaine County

Time: 01 :31 PM

ROA Report
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User: CRYSTAL

Case: CV-2014-0000784 Current Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Susan Jane Warner vs. State Of Idaho Department Of

Susan Jane Warner vs. State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation

Other Claims
Date
5/4/2015

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal scheduled on 05/04/2015
11 :00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100

Robert J. Elgee

Case Taken Under Advisement

Robert J. Elgee

6/25/2015

Decision On Appeal

Robert J. Elgee

No Longer U/A

Robert J. Elgee

Order of Remand to Idaho Department of Transportation

Robert J. Elgee

7/1/2015

Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation, Robert J. Elgee
Defendant; Lauer, Susan Jane, Plaintiff. Filing date: 7/1/2015
STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Robert J. Elgee

7/9/2015

Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs

Robert J. Elgee

7/16/2015

Objection to Petitioner's Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs

Robert J. Elgee

7/20/2015

Notice Of Appeal

Robert J. Elgee

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Robert J. Elgee

STATUS CHANGED: Inactive

Robert J. Elgee

Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Objections Regarding Fees and
Costs

Robert J. Elgee

Affidavit of Andrew Parnes in Support of Response to Respondent's
Objections Regarding Fees and Costs

Robert J. Elgee

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 08/24/2015 10:30 AM) attorney
fees

Robert J. Elgee

Notice Of Hearing

Robert J. Elgee

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion for Attorney fees and Costs
Hearing date: 8/24/2015
Time: 10:29 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation, Attorney: Timothy
Stover
Party: Susan Warner, Attorney: Andrew Parnes

Robert J. Elgee

7/27/2015

7/28/2015

8/24/2015

Robert J. Elgee
Hearing result for Motion for Attorney fees and Costs scheduled on
08/24/2015 10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Susan Israel
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: Stover- telephonic
less 100
9/14/2015

Case Taken Under Advisement

Robert J. Elgee

No Longer U/A

Robert J. Elgee

Memorandum Decision on Attorney Fees

Robert J. Elgee
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ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SUSAN JANE WARNER,
Petitioner,

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2014-

'1f1tj

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW
Lie. No. ZA127717K
ITD File No. MT TK1400262
Fee Category: L-3
Fee; $221.00

Petitioner, Susan Jane Warner, by and through her attorney of record, Andrew
Parnes, petitions this Court for judicial review pursuant to Idaho Code§ 67-5270, et. seq.
and I.R.C.P. 84, as follows:
I.

Judicial review is sought for a decision by the State of Idaho, Department of

Transportation.
2.

This Petition is taken is the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

1
3

the State of Idaho in and for the County of Blaine as the Petitioner, Susan Jane Warner,
...........,....,.., in Blaine County.
3.

The action which is the object of this judicial review is the Idaho

Transportation Department Order affirming a one year absolute driving suspension for
Ms. Warner pursuant to LC. § 49-324.
4.

Ms. Warner was sentenced for a first offense driving under the influence

charge in the State of Montana on September 16, 2016. She was convicted of a violation
of Mt. Code§ 6I-8-465(l)(a), driving with a blood alcohol in excess of .16, specifically a
.176.
5.

After the State of Montana notified the Idaho Transportation Department of

the conviction, Ms. Warner was notified of a one year absolute suspension ofldaho
driving privileges to take effect on October 9, 2014. The order of suspension was unclear
on whether this suspension was based upon the Idaho aggravated driving under the
influence or because Ms. Warner had a prior conviction for driving under the influence
within the past ten years in the State of Idaho.
6.

Ms. Warner timely requested an administrative hearing, which was held on

October 28, 2104, with hearing examiner, Michael Howell. At that hearing, Ms. Warner
submitted a number of exhibits showing that the Montana offense was for a first offense
driving under the influence, that the conviction was not for an excessive DUI of driving
with more than a. 20 BAC, and argued that therefore the suspension in Idaho could be not

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
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more than 90 days with the first 30 days absolute and the balance with restricted
privileges.

7.

On October 31, 2014, the hearing officer entered Findings of Fact and

Conclusion of Law and Preliminary Order.
8.

Ms. Warner filed a timely petition for reconsideration on November 7,

9.

On November 15, 2014, the hearing officer denied the petition for

2014.

reconsideration and entered an order sustaining the one year absolute driving license
suspension. Ms. Warner's driving privileges have been fully suspended since October 9,
2014.

10.

A Statement of Issues for Judicial Review which Ms. Warner intends to

assert include, but are not limited to the following:
a.

Does the State of Idaho have the authority to suspend a person's

driving license for a conviction of first offense driving under the influence charge from
another state when a similar conviction in the State of Idaho would only permit a 90 day
license suspension, even if the driver had a prior DUI conviction within the preceding ten
years?
b.

Whether I.C. § 18-8005(4(e) can apply to an out of state conviction

for a first offense driving under the influence charge when it does not apply to a person so
convicted in the State of Idaho?

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
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c.

Whether LC. § 49-324 permits the Idaho Transportation Department

impose a greater penalty than authorized by Idaho statutes simply because the new
conviction arose outside the State ofldaho?
d.

If permitted by statute, does the tremendous disparity in the

treatment of an out-of-state first offense conviction violated Ms. Warner's constitutional
rights to Equal Protection, Due Process and her Right to Travel as established by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Privilege and
Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution as well as the analogous protections
of the Idaho State Constitution?
11.

A transcript of the Administrative Hearing held on October 28, 2014 is

requested.
12.

By reason of the acts of the Respondent, it has been necessary for Ms.

Warner to retain the services of an attorney. Ms. Warner has incurred and will continue
to incur costs and attorney fees. Ms. Warner requests Respondent be ordered to pay her
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action. Should the matter proceed by
default, attorney's fees and costs incurred shall be Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.) Ms.
Warner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs under I.C. § 12-117, I.R.C.P
54( e) and any other applicable rule, statute or case law.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests the following relief:

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
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I.

That the Court enter an order staying the suspension of the Petitioner's

privileges and that the order provide that the Petitioner's driving privileges will
remain in effect and valid until a decision is issued by this Court on the Petition for
Judicial Review.
2.

That based upon the entire record in the case the Court find that the Idaho

Transportation Department suspension of Petitioner's driving privileges for one year
violates statutory provisions, is not supported by substantial evidence presented at the
hearing, is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion, and is in violation of Ms.
Warner's federal and state constitutional rights.
3.

That this Court set aside the Order of the Hearing Examiner issue dated

November 15, 2014, and that the matter be remanded to the Idaho Transportation
Department with instructions to vacate the one year suspension and to impose no more
than a 90 day suspension, with credit for the suspension already served.
4.

That this Court issue an order that the hearing examiner's order was in

violation of LC. §§ 49-324, 18-8004, 18-8005 and 67-5270, et. seq.
5.

That this Court issue an order that the hearing officer acted without

reasonable basis in fact or law in sustaining the one year suspension and the Order was
arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion and that the Order violated Ms. Warner's
federal and state constitutional rights.
6.

That the Court award Ms. Wamer her attorney fees and costs.

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
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That the Court issue an order such other and further relief as the Court
deems just and equitable.
Dated this

4l. day of December, 2014.

Attorney for Petitioner

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
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VERIFICATION
I, Andrew Parnes, being duly sworn upon oath, hereby depose and state: I am the
attorney for Petitioner, Susan Jane Warner, in the above-entitled action; that service of the
Petition has been made upon the Idaho Transportation Department pursuant to I.R.C.P
S(f); that the Clerk of the administrative agency will be paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the transcript; that the Clerk of the administrative agency will be paid the
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estimated fee for the preparation of the record.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1hay of December, 2014, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method
marked herein:
Driver Services/Administrative Hearing Section
Idaho Transportation Department
P.O. Box 7129
3311 West State Street
Boise, ID 83707

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

- - Mailed

c2':'<ax 208-332-4124
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ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law
First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187

~ynn Drs!!Je, Clerk Dlstrlct
'Otlrt Blaine Cou
Idaho

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SUSAN JANE WARNER,
Petitioner,

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2014-

7){,L{

ORDER STAYING LICENSE
SUSPENSION AND SETTING
SHOW CAUSE HEARJNG

Upon the Filing of the Petition for Judicial Review and for good cause shown
therein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the license suspension of Petitioner which began
on October 9, 2014 is STAYED pending consideration of the Petition.
An Show Cause Hearing on why this Stay shall not remain in effect is set for the
/ ) ~ day of December, 2014, at the hour of

q 301mbefore this Court.

The Court Clerk shall serve this Order on Respondent, Department of
ORDER STAYING LICENSE SUSPENSION ANTI
SETTING SHOW CAUSE HEARJNG

1
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Transportation, forthwith.

Dated:

/ ).. \

'1\ \~

Robert~(y
District Judge

ct'. ~((,(.,{) ~\1\JLS

-r,-D ~-331..- c..1,1..'-}
ORDER STAYING LICENSE SUSPENSION AND
SETTING SHOW CAUSE HEARING
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COU1\1TY OF BLAINE
j

SUSAN JANE WARNER,
Petitioner,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

---------FILED ~:~9b.rolfJ
J DEC - ml'!

Case No. CV-2014-784

I

JoLynn Drags, Cl6lt District
Court Blalrie Cnuntv. Idaho

.

~......--.

PROCEDURAL ORDER GOVERNING
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY
ACTION BY DISTRICT COURT

Respondent.
A Petition for Judicial Review has been filed in the above-entitled District Court
seeking judicial review of state agency and local government actions. This Order,
together with Rule 84, Idaho Rules ofCivil Procedure, (lR.C.P.) and the applicable
statutes shall govern all proceedings before this Court.

1. Petition for Judicial Review or Cross-Petitions for Judicial Review; Filing
Fees: The petitioner's Petition for Judicial Review was filed
December 4, 2014
A Cross-Petition for Judicial Review has not been filed. If not already paid, all judicial
review filing fees, if any, must be paid within seven (7) days after filing of the Petition
for Judicial Review or Cross-Petition for Judicial Review. Failure to timely pay any filing
fee shall be grounds for dismissal without further notice.

2. Stays: Unless provided by Statute, the filing of a Petition or Cross-Petition
does not automatically stay the proceedings and enforcement of the action of an agency
that is subject to the Petition. Any application or Motion for Stay must be made in
accordance with lR.C.P. Rule 84(m).

3. Form of Review: Pursuant to lR.C.P. 84(e)(l), when judicial review is
authorized by statute, judicial review shall be based upon the record created before the
agency rather than as a trial de novo, unless the statute or law provides for the procedure
or standard. If the authorized statute provides the district court may take additional
evidence upon judicial review, it may order the same on its own motion or the motion of
any party. If the statute provides that review is de novo, the appeal shall be tried in the
district court on any and all issues, on a new record. Pursuant to lR.C.P. Rule 84(e)(2),
the scope of review on petition from an agency to the district court shall be as provided
by statute.

4. Preparation of Agency Record; Payment of Fees: Pursuant to lR. C.P.
84(f), when the statute provides what shall be contained in the official record of the

I 12
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agency upon judicial review, the agency shall prepare the record as provided by statute.
Otherwise, the documents listed in paragraph (3) of LR.C.P. Rule 84(f) shall constitute
the agency record for review. Petitioner shall pay all fees as required for preparation of
the agency record in accordance with LR.C.P. Rule 84(e)(4). The clerk of the agency in
accordance with lR.C.P. Rule 84(e)(5) shall lodge the record with the agency within 14
days of the filing of the Petition for Judicial Review. Any extension sought for
preparation of the agency record shall be made by the agency to the district court.

5. Preparation of Transcript, Payment of Fee: The Court requires the
provision of a written transcript prepared from the recorded or reported proceedings. It is
the responsibility of the Petitioner (or Cross-Petitioner, as the case may be) to timely
arrange and pay for preparation of all portions of the transcript reasonably necessary for
review. Pursuant to lR.C.P. 84(g), the responsible party shall contact the agency clerk to
determine the estimated cost of the transcript, and pay the estimated cost in accordance
with I.R.C.P. 84(g)(l)(A) or (2)(A) as the case may be. The transcript shall be lodged
with the agency within 14 days of the filing of the petition for judicial review in
accordance with l.R.C.P. 84(g)(l)(B), (C) or 84(g)(2)(B)(C) as the case may be. The
transcriber may apply to the district court for an extension of time, for good cause shown.
6. Settlement of Transcript and Record. Pursuant to IR. C.P. 84G), and unless
otherwise provided by statute, upon receipt of the transcript and upon completion of the
record, the agency shall mail or deliver Notice of Lodging of Transcript and Record to all
attorneys of record or parties appearing in person and to the district court. The parties
shall have 14 days from the date of mailing of the notice to pick up a copy of the
transcript and agency record and to object to the transcript or record. All fees for the
preparation of the transcript and record shall be paid by the responsible party at or before
the pick up of the agency record and transcript. Any objection to the record shall be
determined by the agency within 14 days of receipt of the objection and the agency
decision on the objection shall be included in the record on petition for review. Upon the
failure of the party to object within 14 days, the transcript and record shall be deemed
settled. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(k), the settled record and transcript shall be lodged with
the district court within 42 days of the service of the Petition for Judicial Review.
7. Augmentation of Record-Additional Evidence Presented to District
Court- Remand to Agency to Take Additional Evidence: Pursuant to LR.C.P. 84(1)
the agency record and/or transcript on review may be augmented upon motion by a party
within 21 days of the filing of the settled transcript and record in the manner prescribed
by LA.R. 30. The taking of additional evidence by the district court and/or agency on
remand shall be governed by statute or LR.C.P. 84(1).
8.
Briefs: The petitioner's brief shall be filed with the clerk within 35 days
after lodging of the transcript and record. The respondent's brief (cross-petitioner's brief)
shall be filed within 28 days after service of petitioner's brief. The petitioner may file a
reply brief within 21 days after service of respondent's brief. The organization and
content of briefs shall be governed by LA.R. 35 and 36. Pursuant to l.R.C.P. 84(p) only
one (1) original signed brief may be filed with the court; however, an additional copy of
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any brief will be plainly marked "Judge's copy" and will be provided for use by the
court, mailed or delivered to the judge in chambers. Copies of all briefs shall be served
on all parties.

9. Extensions of Time: Motions to extend the time for filing a brief shall be
submitted in conformity with LA.R. 34(e). All other requests for extension of time shall
be submitted in conformity with I.A.R. 46.
10. Motions: All motions shall be submitted in conformity with LR. C.P. 84(o)
and shall be heard with out oral argument unless ordered by the Court.
11. Oral Argument: After all briefs have been filed, either party may set the
matter for oral argument pursuant to LR.C.P. 84(q). If neither party notices the matter for
oral argument within 14 days of the filing of the last brief (or the time for filing briefs has
expired) the Court will deem oral argument waived and the matter will be decided on the
record, transcript and briefs. If the matter is set for oral argument, the form and order of
argument shall be governed by LA.R. 37. It is the responsibility of both counsel to set the
case for oral argument or notify the Court in writing that argument has been waived.
12. Judgment or Decision. The Court's decision will be by written
memorandum which shall constitute the Judgment or Decision required by I.R. C.P.
84(t)(l).

13. Attorneys Fees and Costs on Appeal: Costs and attorneys fees on judicial
review shall be claimed, objected to and fixed in accordance with I.A.R. 40 and 41,
provided that only one original signed claim, objection or supporting or opposing
affidavit need be filed.
14. Remittitur: If no notice of appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court is filed within
forty-two (42) days after filing of the Court's written decision, the clerk shall issue a

remittitur remanding the matter to the agency as provided in I.R. C.P. 84(t)(4).
15. Failure to Comply: Failure by either party to timely comply with the
requirement of this Order or provisions of the Idaho Rules ofCivil Procedure or Idaho
Appellate Rules, if applicable, shall be grounds for imposition of sanctions, including, but
not limited to the allowance of attorneys fees, striking of briefs or dismissal of the appeal
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11 and 84(n) and I.A.R. 11.1 and 21.

DATED this

_!/_ day of /ku.mt)U"' ,20_!$
~dge
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I, undersigned, hereby certify that on the _5_ day of
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing, by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:

Andrew Parnes
PO Box 5988

Ketchum, ID 83340

Idaho Transportation Department
PO Box 7129
Boise, ID 83 707

(~U.S. Mail
( ) Hand delivered
( ) Faxed
( ) Court Folder

()(5 U.S. Mail
( ) Hand delivered
( ) Faxed
( ) Court Folder

CLERK OF THE COURT

By:~~

4 15

'14 16:47 FROM-WFS
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208-736-9929

T-901 P0005/0006 F-743

Fl LED ;.M~..,.,..

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General

State of Idaho

OEC 1 0 2014

Timothy J. Stover
Special Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
905 Shoshone Street North

.k,l.ynn Drage, Cl8rl< District
Court Blaine Coun , l@=sho.....--

P.O. Box 1428
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1248
Telephone: (208) 736-9900
Facsimile: (208) 736-9929

ISB #4842

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
*****
SUSAN JANE WARNER,
)
Petitioner,
V.

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2014-784

NOTICE OF NON-OBJECTION TO
ORDER STAYING LICENSE
SUSPENSION

COMES NOW, Timothy J. Stover, attorney for Respondent, State of Idaho, Department of
Transportation, and hereby notifies the Court of its non-objection to the Order Staying License

Suspension and Setting Show Cause Hearing entered by this Court on December 4, 2014
pursuant to the Petitioner, Susan Jane Wainer, filing her Petition for Judicial Review.
Further, pursuant to this Notice of Non-Objection, Respondent requests that this Court

cancel the Show Cause Hearing on why this Stay shall not remain in effect which is presently
scheduled to be heard on December 15, 2014.
NOTICE OF NON-OBJECTION TO ORDER STAYING LICENSES SUSPENSION • l
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'14 16:47 FROM-WFS,

this

day

208-736-9929

C

T-901 P0006/0006 F-743

December.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies th.at on the IO'h day of December, 2014, he caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following
maru1er:
Andrew Parnes
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
(9Q. Facsimile
(.208) 726-11 - - - - -

i)

NOTICE OF NON-OBJECTION TO ORDER STAYING LICENSES SUSPENSION - 2
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LAW OFFICES

BENOIT, ALEXANDER.
HARWOOD & HIGH, L.L.P.
126 Second Avenue North
P.O. Box366
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0366
Telephone (208) 733-5463

Facsimile No. (208) 734-1438

FACSIMILE
Clerk - District Court

TO:

COMP ANY: Blaine County Courthouse

FAX#:

(208) 788-5527

FROM:

Bren E. Mollerup

DATE:

December 10, 2014

RE:

Swindley v. Lynn & Bontrager-Case No. CV-13-664

NU.MBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET): 3
NOTE:

Please contact our office immediately in the event you fail to receive the designated

number of pages or have a problem with the transmission.
MESSAGE:

Attached is the signed Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice. Please fax file
the same.
I am placing in the mail tonight copies of the Stipulation and Order to be court
stamped and copies returned to counsel, along with self-addressed,
stamped envelopes.
Please vacate the Pretrial Hearing that is scheduled for Monday, December
15th at 1:30 p.m.
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE

THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS FACSIMILE IS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OR ATIORNEY WORK
PRODUCT OR. BOTH AND IS FOR THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE INTENDED RECIPIENT LISTED ABOVE ANY
READING, DISCLOSURE, USE OR REPRODUCTION OF THIS COMMUNICATION OTHER THAN BY THE INTENDED
RECIPIENT IS PROHIBITED. lF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS COMMUNICATION JN ERROR, PLEASE NOTIFY US
BY COLLECT TELEPHONE CALL IMMEDIATELY AND RETURN THE COMMUNICATION TO US VIA U.S. MAIL.

Original Document will:

follow by regular mail
follow by express mail
not be sent
(16202\Clerk Fax)
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DEC 1 O2014

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

Attomey General
State of Idaho
Timothy J. Stover

Special Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
905 Shoshone Street North
P.O. Box 1428
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1248
Telephone: (208) 736~9900
Facsimile: (208) 736-9929

ISB #4842

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

*** * *

SUSAN JANE WARNER,
Petitioner.

v.

)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

)
)
)

Respondent.

)
)

Case No. CV 2014-784

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

COMES NOW, Timothy J. Stover, and hereby enters his appearance as counsel of record
for Respondent State of Idaho, Department of Transportation. A true and correct copy of his
appointment as Special Deputy Prosecuting Attorney General is attached. Please serve all pleadings
and papers in this matter to Timothy J. Stover. P.O. Box 1428, Twin Falls, Idaho 833u..-·,-..L:.
DATED this 10th day of December, 2014.

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE • l
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208-736-9929

T-901 P0003/0006 F-743

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the 101h day of December, 2014, he caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following

manner:

Ar1dtew Patnes
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
~ } Overnight Mail
Facsimile

\X:

(208) 726-1187

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2
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STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

December 4, 2013

Timothy J. Stover
Worst, Fitzgerald & Stover, PLLC
P. 0. Box 5226
Twin Falls, ID 83303~5226
Re:

Special Deputy Attorney General Appointment Suspension (ALS) Program

Automatic License

Dear Mr. Stover:
I enclose your renewal appointment as Special Deputy Attorney General for the purpose
of representing the State of Idaho in any appeal from a hearing officer's decision in
Idaho Transportation Department·District 4 filed pursuant to the authority of Idaho Code
§ 18-8002A; Automatic License Suspension Program. Please include the appointment
when you appear as attorney of record in any such appeal.
It is our understanding that you have reached an agreement with the Idaho
Transportation Department regarding the payment of your costs and fees incurred in the
representation of the state in these matters.
This appointment will expire on December 31, 2014, or at such earlier date as
determined by this office .
Sincerely,

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
LGW:blm
Enc.
c:
! ~ .!

-~: Brian

w. Ness} ldaho-Transportation Department

.:.;: .:Larfy AUen; ·1dah6 Transportatioh.Oepartment
•

'

'

.

P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720·0010
Tafapnone: (208) 334-2400, FAX: (208) 854-0071
L.o Gated at 700

w. Jllfterson Street, Suite 210

21

Beth Schiller
Administrative Assistant,
Idaho Transportation Department
11 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83701-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8755
Facsimile: (208) 332-2002

FILED ~·i-DEC 1 7 2014

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
Susan Jane Warner,

)

)

Petitioner,

)
)

Case No.

CV-2014-784

)

v.
State of Idaho,
Department of Transportation

)
)
)
)
)

NOTICE OF LODGING
OF AGENCY RECORD

Respondent.
)
_______________
)

Beth Schiller, Administrative Assistant of the Idaho Transportation Department, hereby
gives notice pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84U) of lodging of the agency record in the above-captioned
matter. The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the mailing of this notice in
which to file with the agency any objections. If no objections to the record are filed with the
agency within fourteen (14) days, the record shall be deemed settled. Parties may pick up a copy
of the record between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. at the Idaho Transportation
Department, 3311 West State Street, Boise, Idaho 83703.
The Agency Record consists of the following documents:

NOTICE OF LODGING OF AGENCY RECORD - 1
22

Page Number

Description
Conviction Record from Madison County Justice Court Montana
Notice of Suspension
Request for Hearing
Copy of Petitioner's Driver's License Record
Notice of Telephone Hearing
Miscellaneous Correspondence and Documents
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order
Motion for Reconsideration
Order on Motion for Reconsideration
Petition for Judicial Review
Order to Stay License Suspension
Procedural Order Governing Judicial Review
Transcription Estimate Request

1
2-4
5-7
8-11
12
13~18
19-23
24-34
35-36
37-44
45-47
48-51
52

As of this DATE, December 15, 2014, a Transcript has [ x ], has not [ ] been requested
by the petitioner or his attorney.

DATED this 15th day of December, 2014.

/

4'e&i.-~

· Beth Schiller
Idaho Transportation Department

NOTICE OF LODGING OF AGENCY RECORD - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby

that on this 15th day of December, 2014, I caused to be served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

ANDREW PARNES
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. BOX 5988
KETCHUM, ID 83340

TIMOTHY STOVER
ATTORNEY AT LAW

_x_u.s. MAIL
_HAND DELIVERED
__OVEKt\HGHT MAIL
_TELECOPY (FAX)
-1.l_ELECTRONIC MAIL
_HAND DELIVERED
_OVERNIGHT MAIL
_TELECOPY (FAX)

4.~>~
Beth Schiller
Idaho Transportation Department

NOTICE OF LODGING OF AGENCY RECORD - 3
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho

Timothy J. Stover
Special Deputy Attorney General

Idaho Transportation Department
905 Shoshone Street North
P.O. Box i428
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1248

Telephone: (208) 736-9900
Facsimile; (208) 736-9929

!SB #4842

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
*****

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Respondent.

)
)

SUSAN JANE WARNER,
Petitioner,

v.

Case No. CV 2014-784

NOTICE OF COURT REPORTER'S
ESTIMATE

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, by and through its
counsel of record, Timothy J. Stover, Special Deputy Attorney General, and pursuant to IRCP
84(g), provides Notice of Court Reporter's Estimate. Pursuant to Exhibit "A" attached hereto,
Petitioner's estimated cost for preparation of the transcript is $75.00.

DATED this 23rd day of December, 2014.

~1

,/

~0tliy J. Stove~,._..,,.,,

NOTICE OF COURT REPORTER'S ESTIMATE - I
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LLC

208-736-9929

P0003/0004 F-752

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the 23rd day of December) 2014, he caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following
manner:

Andrew Parnes

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Attorney at Law

( ) Hand Delivered

P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile
(208) 726-1187

/~-----7
,/7

,/~/·( ~ /

//
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December 20, 2014

HEDRICK
C OURT REPORTING

'!'IMOTHYUJ. STOVER, ESQ.
Worst, Fitzgerald & Stover
P.O. Box 1428
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1428

RE:

Susan Jane Warner, DL#: ZA127717K

File#: MT TK1400262
October 28. 2014

0/S DUI Suspension, Date of Hearing:
Dear Mr. Stover:

Per the request of Amy Kearns, Driver Records Program
Specialist, we are hereby providing you with an
estimate of the transcription costs in the above
entitled matter.

Cost of preparing an original plus two copies from the
compact disc provided by the state, with an estimated
length of 8 minutes is:
$75.00

Delivery time is 10 working days from the date that we
receive written authority to proceed from Petitioner's
legal counsel.

Petitioner's payment .must be received

prior to delivery of the transcript.
Thank you.
Sincerely,

cc:

g_.,

Amy Kearns

tu. ~ fca-irM'@~.fi~ mlJ

POST OFFICE BOX 578
BOISE, IDAHO 83701

208-336-9208

EXHIBIT

A

Beth Schiller
Administrative Assistant, Driver Services
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83701-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8637
Facsimile: (208) 332-2002

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

)
)

Susan Jane Warner,
Petitioner,

v.
State ofldaho,
Department of Transportation
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

CV-2014-784

NOTICE OF FILING
AGENCY RECORD

Pursuant to 1.R.C.P. 84(k), the attached agency record in the above entitled matter is now
deemed settled and is hereby filed.
DATED this 30th day of December, 2014.

~--~kl-

1Beth Schill:r
Idaho Transportation Department

NOTICE OF FILING AGENCY RECORD - l
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of December. 2014, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
ANDREW PARNES
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. BOX 5988
KETCHUM, ID 83340

_x_u.s. MAIL

TIMOTHY STOVER
ATTORNEY AT LAW

-X_ELECTRONIC MAIL
_HAND DELIVERED
_OVERNIGHT MAIL
_TELECOPY (FAX)

_HAND DELIVERED
_OVERNIGHT MAIL
_TELECOPY (FAX)

Pages 1-52 of the Agency Record were emailed to Mr. Parnes on 12/18/14. Page 53 of
the Agency Record was mailed to Mr. Parnes' office on 12/30/14.

/5~~,iA

~

~

Beth Schiller
Idaho Transportation Department

NOTICE OF FILING AGENCY RECORD - 2
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LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
Timothy J. Stover
Special Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
905 Shoshone Street North
P.O. Box i428
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1248
Telephone: (208) 736-9900
Facsimile: (208) 736-9929
ISB #4842

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

*****

SUSAN JANE WARNER,
Petitioner,
V.

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.
COMES

NOW,

the

Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE

Case No. CV 2014-784

NOTICE OF FILING
TRANSCRIPT

OF

IDAHO

DEPARTMENT

OF

TRANSPORTATION, by and through its counsel of record, Special Deputy Attorney General
TIMOTHY J. STOVER and pursuant to IRCP 84(g) and 84(j), provides the Court with the original
transcript of the Administrative License Suspension Hearing for the Idaho Department of
Transportation in the Matter of SUSAN JANE WARNER, File No. MT TKl 400262, held October
28, 2014, before hearing officer Michael Howell of the Idaho Department of Transportation.
By this Notice of Filing of Transcript, the undersigned hereby provides notice that a copy of
said Tra..nscript has been retained by the undersigned with an additional copy beh,g mailed to
counsel for Petitioner with this Notice of Filing of Transcript. Notice is also provided that any
NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT - l
30

objections to the Transcript shall be filed within fourteen
Notice of Filing of Transcript with the Idaho Department

days from the date of mailing of this
Transportation. Failure to file an

objection within said fourteen (14) days shall result in the Transcript being deemed settled. Any
objection made to the Transcript shall be determined by the Idaho Department of Transportation
within fourteen (14) days of receipt thereof. The Idaho Department of Transportation's decision on

the objection and all evidence, e:id1ibits, and written presentations on the objection shall be included
in the record on petition for review.
DATED this 15th day of January, 2015.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the 15th day of January, 2015, he caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following manner:
Andrew Parnes
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(208) 726-1187

NOTlCE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT - 2
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Beth Schiller
Administrative Assistant, Driver Services
Idaho Transportation Department
3311 West State Street
P.O. Box 7129
Boise, Idaho 83701-1129
Telephone: (208) 334-8637
Facsimile: (208) 332-2002

FEB 2 4 20f5
J,."!!nn Drage, Clerk District
'-NUrt Blaine County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
Susan Jane Warner,

)
)

Petitioner,

v.
State of Idaho,
Department of Transportation
Respondent.
______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

CV-2014-784

AMENDED NOTICE OF FILING
AGENCY RECORD

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(k), the attached agency record in the above entitled matter is now
deemed settled and is hereby filed.
DATED this 20th day of February, 2015.

.,

~~
.

7

Beth Schiller
Idaho Transportation Department

NOTICE OF FILING AGENCY RECORD - l
32

·CERTIF1CA1E OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on

20th day of February, 2015, I caused to be served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

ANDREW PARNES
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. BOX 5988
KETCHUM, ID 83340

_x_u.s. MAIL

TIMOTHY STOVER
ATTORNEY AT LAW

_K_ELECTRONIC MAIL
_HAND DELIVERED
_OVERNIGHT MAIL
_1ELECOPY (FAX)

_HAND DELIVERED
_OVERNIGHT MAIL
_1ELECOPY (FAX)

Copies of pages 1-59 of the Amended Agency Record were emailed to Mr. Parnes on
2/20/15.

~~~

' Beth Schiller
Idaho Transportation Department

NOTICE OF FILING AGENCY RECORD - 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SUSAN JANE WARNER,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2014-784

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

-

ANDREW PARNES
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: 208-726-10 I 0
Facsimile: 208-726-1187
Attorney for Petitioner

TIMOTHY J. STOVER
Special Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
905 Shoshone Street North
P.O. Box 1428
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1248
Telephone: 208-736-9900
Facsimile: 208-736-9929
Attorney for Respondent
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Susan Jane Warner, filed a petition for judicial review

a State of

Idaho, Department of Transportation decision, affirming a one year absolute driving
suspension pursuant to LC. § 49-324.
On October 31, 2014, the hearing officer entered Findings ofFact and Conclusions
of Law and Preliminary Order. (Agency Record, hereinafter "AR," 25-29.) Ms. Warner
filed a timely petition for reconsideration on November 7, 2014. (AR 30-40.)
On November 15, 2014, the hearing officer denied the petition for reconsideration
and entered an order sustaining the one year absolute driving license suspension. (AR 4142.) This Petition for Judicial Review was timely filed on December 4, 2014. (AR 43.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ms. Warner was sentenced for a first offense driving under the influence charge in
the State of Montana on September 16, 2016. She was convicted of a violation of MCA
§ 61-8-465(1)(a), driving with a blood alcohol in excess of .16, specifically a .176. (AR
21.)
After receiving notice of the conviction from the State of Montana, the Idaho
Transportation Department (hereinafter "Department") sent Ms. Warner was notification
of a one year absolute suspension of her Idaho driving privileges effective on October 9,
2014. (AR 2-3.)

1
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The order of suspension was unclear on whether this suspension was based upon
Idaho aggravated driving under the influence or because Ms. Warner had a prior
conviction for driving under the influence within the past ten years in the State of Idaho.
However, the hearing officer's decision concluded that the one year license suspension
was valid because Ms. Warner had suffered a prior conviction for a DUI within the State
of Idaho and the Montana conviction was thus her second offense within a ten year
period. (AR 41.)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Does the State of Idaho have the authority to suspend a person's driving

privileges for a conviction of first offense driving under the influence charge from
another state when a similar conviction in the State of Idaho would only permit a 90 day
license suspension, even if the driver had a prior DUI conviction within the preceding ten
years?
2.

Whether LC.§ 18-8005(4)(e) can apply to an out-of-state conviction for a

first offense driving under the influence charge when it does not apply to a person so
convicted in the State of Idaho?
3.

Whether I.C. § 49-324 permits the Idaho Transportation Department to

impose a greater penalty than authorized by Idaho statutes simply because the new
conviction arose outside the State of Idaho?

2
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4.

Even if permitted by statute, does the disparate treatment of an out-of-state

offense conviction violate Ms. Warner's constitutional rights to Equal Protection,
Due Process and her Right to Travel as established by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Privilege and Immunities Clause
of the United States Constitution as well as the analogous protections of the Idaho State
Constitution?
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
Pursuant to I.C. § 12-117 and I.R.C.P., Rule 54(e), Ms. Warner is entitled to
reasonable attorney fees and costs should she prevail in this matter.
ARGUMENT
1.

Ms. Warner's Montana Conviction was not for a Second Offense

Ms. Warner was originally charged in Montana by complaint with a second
offense DUI. (AR 38.) During the court proceedings, an amended complaint was filed
alleging only that she drove a vehicle with more than a .16, in violation of MCA§ 61-8465(l)(a), which is separate and distinct from the statute controlling a second offense
-

DUI in Montana. (AR 22.) She subsequently pied guilty to this amended charge and the
Judgment itself demonstrates that this was not a conviction for a second offense in
Montana. (AR 1, 21.) Ms. Warner was sentenced as a first time offender.
Thereafter, Ms. Warner was notified that pursuant to I.C. § 49-324 her license
would be suspended in Idaho. Section 49-324 reads:
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The department shall suspend, disqualify or revoke the driver's license or
privilege of any resident of this state or the privilege of a nonresident to
operate a motor vehicle in this state upon receiving notice of the conviction,
administrative action or court order of that person in another state or
jurisdiction of an offense which, ifcommitted in this state, would be
grounds for the suspension, disqualification or revocation ofthe driver's
license and privileges of the driver. The department shall forward a
certified copy or electronic transfer to the national driver register.

-

(Emphasis added.)
No matter how many prior convictions a person may have had within the previous
ten years, if that person is sentenced for a first offense driving under the influence
conviction, the license suspension under Idaho law is for a thirty-day absolute suspension,
followed by sixty days of restricted driving privileges. I.C. § 18-8005( 1)( d). Therefore,
under section 49-324, Ms Warner's license can be suspended only for the period set forth
in section 18-8005(1)(d) and the Department erred in suspending her privileges for a
greater period than if the crime had been committed in Idaho. On this ground alone, the
Department's decision must be reduced to the length of suspension permitted for a first

-

offense violation in Idaho.
2.

I.C. § 18-8005(4 )( e) Does not Apply

In rejecting Ms. Warner's objections, the hearing officer concluded that the

-

Department had the power to apply the suspension for a second offense DUI solely
because Ms. Warner's conviction occurred within ten years of a prior conviction. (AR
41.)

4

41

There is no question that a person who is convicted of a second offense DUI
within Idaho shall have her privileges suspended for one year, with no restricted permit.
See, I.C. § 18-8005(4 )( e) ["Shall have his driving privileges suspended by the court for an
additional mandatory minimum period of one (1) year after release from confinement,
during which one (I) year period absolutely no driving privileges of any kind may be
granted."]. But Ms. Warner was not convicted of a second offense DUI in Montana. 1
The Department cites no statute or case law permitting the Department to impose a
sentence greater than the maximum suspension for the offense committed by the driver.
The Department does not dispute the fact that throughout Idaho many defendants are
convicted of a first offense DUI despite the fact that they had prior convictions for the
same offense within the prior ten year period. Once a defendant is convicted in an Idaho

-

court of a first offense DUI, the Department has no authority to suspend the license for
longer than the maximum imposed by statute and pronounced in the court judgment. To
permit otherwise would impose sentences greater than the maximum permitted by Idaho
law and would deny defendants the benefits of their bargains in the criminal courts.
Therefore, since Ms. Warner was not convicted under a statute with penalties
similar to LC. § 18-8005(4 )( e), her one year suspension must be set aside.

1

Had the complaint not been amended and had her Montana conviction been for a
second offense, she would not have grounds to challenge the one year suspension.
5
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3.

The Fact of the Out-of-State Conviction Does not Authorize
a One Year License Suspension

The Department's position appears to be that it can disregard the nature of the
conviction and impose a greater suspension solely because the conviction occurred in
another state. This argument must be rejected.
Section 49-324 permits a suspension for a foreign conviction only if the act
committed in Idaho would be grounds for a license suspension. The purpose behind the
statute is straightforward - no one should avoid a license suspension from her own state
simply because the violation occurred in another jurisdiction. Similarly, the legislature

-

did not give the Department authority to impose a greater suspension solely because the
illegal activity occurred in a foreign jurisdiction. In fact, the purpose of the notice
provisions of the interstate compact is to assure the a person's home state is made aware
of any driving violations committed outside the State.
Ms. W amer is not asking that her conviction in Montana have no repercussion for
her in Idaho; she simply asks that she not be punished more than if the crime had been
committed within Idaho, and the statute permits no more. Here, the Department has
chosen to disregard the nature of the Montana conviction and impose a greater
suspension. There is no basis for this action and the one year license suspension must be
set aside.

6
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4.

The Department's Application of the Statute also Violates Ms. Warner's
Constitutional Rights

If this Court holds that the Department has the authority to impose a greater license
suspension solely because this conviction occurred out of Idaho, such an interpretation
violates Ms. Warner's federal and state constitutional rights to equal protection of the
law, her right to travel and due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and
the Privilege and Immunities Clause to the United States Constitution and the Idaho State
Constitution.
Ms. Warner is being singled out for the additional suspension solely because her
conviction was in Montana, not Idaho. There is no rational basis for the State, through
the Transportation Department, to impose a greater suspension than permitted had the

-

conviction been within the State. The entire goal of the interstate compact is to assure
that drivers as a class, whether they drive within or without the state, are treated equally
under the laws of the State ofldaho. Because Ms. Warner is being singled out from other
drivers, her suspension must be set aside.

-

When considering the Fourteenth Amendment, strict scrutiny applies to
fundamental rights and suspect classes; intermediate scrutiny applies to
classifications involving gender and illegitimacy; and rational basis scrutiny
applies to all other challenges. For analyses made under the Idaho
Constitution, slightly different levels of scrutiny apply. Strict scrutiny, as
under federal law, applies to fundamental rights and suspect classes.
Means-focus scrutiny, unlike federal intermediate scrutiny, is employed
"where the discriminatory character of a challenged statutory classification
is apparent on its face and where there is also a patent indication of lack of
relationship between the classification and the declared purpose of the
statute." Rational basis scrutiny applies to all other challenges.
7
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v, Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 830, 25

850 (2001 ), citing State v. Mowry, 34 Idaho

751, 754, 9 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2000).
Under the rational basis standard, the court must determine if the challenged
classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See, Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620,635 (1996).
In addition, imposing this greater suspension violates Ms. Warner's right to travel

-

in other states. "Freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized

-

as a basic right under the Constitution." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758

(1966). "[A]ny classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is
unconstitutional." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,634 (1969).
If a person can receive penalties from Idaho, greater than that permitted for driving
within the State, her right to travel to other parts of the United States is impinged upon.
In this case, the State of Montana imposed its sentence for a first offense DUI conviction.
Idaho law permits the Department to impose a suspension because she is an Idaho
licensed driver. But merely because she decided to travel out of state and was convicted
of a first offense DUI when doing so, Idaho's imposition of a greater suspension greater
impinges on Ms. Warner's right to travel without the State having a compelling interest in

-

doing so.
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Because LC. §18-8005(4)(e) requires a finding by a court on proof beyond a
reasonable doubt or a guilty plea to the elements of a second offense DUI to permit the
Department to impose a one year suspension, this code section cannot be used by the
Department without identical proof that Ms. Warner was convicted in Montana of a
second offense DUI, in order to impose an administrative suspension in excess of a first
offense DUL Because there was no court finding that this was a second offense, the
Department imposed suspension violates Ms. Warner's rights and must be set aside.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court must set aside the one-year license
suspension imposed by the Department and order that the Department may only impose a
license suspension for a first offense DUI if committed within the State of Idaho, with

-

credit for the time before Ms. Warner's license suspension was stayed.
Dated this

J't1' day of February, 2015.

/JU--~
~
Attorney for Petitioner
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III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This case began with the filing of a Petition for Judicial Review ("Petition") in the District

Court for the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Blaine ("District
Court"). The Petition, filed by Petitioner Susan Jane Warner. ("Warner"), requests review of a decision
from the Department, by and through its Hearing Officer, Michael B. Howell ("Hearing Officer"). The
administrative decision in question sustained the Notice of Suspension ("Notice").

B.

Course of Proceedings.
On September 23, 2014, the Department issued the Notice, suspending Warner's license forone

year. Id. at 2-4. Warner requested a hearing on October 1, 2014. Id. at 5. A hearing was held on October
16, 2014. Id. at 25. The Hearing Officer upheld the suspension on October 31, 2014. Id. at 27.
Thereafter, Warner submitted a Petition for Reconsideration. Id. at 30-34. The Hearing Officer denied
Warner's petition on November 15, 2014. Id. at 41. Warner filed this Petition on December 4, 2014.

C.

Statement of Facts.
On July 9, 2012, Warner was convicted of driving under the influence ("DUI") in Idaho. R. 25;

See R. 9, 36. On April 5, 2014, Warner was involved in a single-car accident in Montana. Id. at 35-36.
It appeared that Warner had veered off the highway, hit a concrete barrier, and then ended up back on
the highway. Id. Warner was detained and given a breath test, which produced a blood alcohol content
("BAC") of .179. Id. After being transported to the Madison Valley Medical Center for evaluation
following her crash, Warner consented to a blood draw. Id. Her blood draw later revealed a BAC of
.176. Id. Warner was cited for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol-2nd offense, in violation of
Montana Code Annotated ("MCA")§ 6I-8-401(1)(a). ld.
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On July
violation of MCA§

the State of Montana amended the charge against Warner to Aggravated DUI,
-8-465(l)(a). Id. at

On September 16,

Warner pied guilty to the

Aggravated DUI charge. Id. at 21. On or about September 22, 2014, the Idaho Transportation
Department (the "Department") received notice of Warner's Montana Aggravated DUI conviction. Id.
at 1. On September 23, 2014, the Department issued a Notice of Suspension ("Notice"), suspending
Warner's license for one year. Id. at 2-4. Warner requested a hearing on October 1, 2014. Id. at 5. A
hearing was held on October 16, 2014. Id. at 25. At the Hearing, Warner argued that "the aggravated
DUI in - - Montana is a different statute than aggravated DUI in Idaho." Tr. 2-3. Warner continued
arguing that because the enhanced DUI in Idaho required a BAC of .20, the enhanced DUI in Montana
only required a .16, and Warner's BAC was approximately .17, the enhanced DUI could not serve as a
basis for her year-long suspension in Idaho. Id. Warner also argued "in order for it to be a year
suspension under Idaho, the Court has to - - it has to be a conviction for a second offense DUI, not a - not just a happens to be a second offense." Id. at 4. The Hearing Officer upheld the suspension on
October 31, 2014. R. 27. Thereafter, Warner submitted a Petition for Reconsideration. Id. at 30-34. The
Hearing Officer denied Warner's petition on November 15, 2014. Id. at 41. Warner filed her Petition
for Judicial Review on December 4, 2014.
IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAP A) governs the review of department
decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a person's driver's license. See Idaho
Code§§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270; See also, In re Suspension of Driver's License of

Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 941, 155 P.3d 1176, 1180 (Ct. App. 2006). An administrative driver's
license suspension "is a civil penalty separate and apart from any other suspension imposed for a

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF-6

54

violation of other Idaho motor vehicle codes or for a conviction of an offense." In re Bowman, 1
868

). A court may overturn an agency's decision only

when the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or
constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful
procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse of discretion. Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision must
demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) and that a
substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Bd ofCounty Comm 'rs,
131 Idaho 426,429, 958 P.2d 583,586 (1998); See also, In re Marshall, 137 Idaho 337,340, 48 P.3d
666,669 (Ct. App. 2002); In re Beyer, 155 Idaho 40, 44,304 P.3d 1206, 1210 (Ct. App. 2013).

V.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
The Department was required to suspend Wamer' s license for one year. Wamer is attempting to
exploit the differences between Idaho DUI laws and Montana DUI laws to evade the obvious
conclusion that had W amer committed the Montana DUI in Idaho, her license would be suspended for
one year. Wamer does not dispute the Agency's authority to suspend her license, rather Wamer contests
the appropriate duration of that suspension.

A. Interpreting the Department's authority.
Two Idaho Code sections provide the Department with the authority to suspend Warner's
license. First, Idaho Code§ 49-324 states that the Department
shall suspend, disqualify or revoke the driver's license or privilege of any resident of
this state or the privilege of a nonresident to operate a motor vehicle in this state upon
receiving notice of the conviction, administrative action, or court order of that person in
another state or jurisdiction of an offense which, if committed in this state, would be
grounds for the suspension, disqualification or revocation of the driver's iicense and
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privileges
the driver. The department shall forward a certified copy or electronic
transfer to the national driver register.
Similarly, Idaho Code§ 49-326(l)(e) states that the Department
is authorized to suspend, disqualify or revoke the license or privileges of a driver
without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence
that the driver: ... [h]as committed an offense in another state or jurisdiction as
evidenced by a conviction, court order or administrative action, which if committed in
Idaho would be grounds for suspension, disqualification or revocation ...
Warner interprets these statutes such that the Department can only consider the form of the
conviction, and not the facts underlying the conviction, in determining the appropriate suspension
length. Warner's narrow interpretation of these statutes is contradicted by the language and purpose of
the statutes.
Warner's interpretation is not consistent with the language of the statutes. "The plain
meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless
plain meaning leads to absurd results." Bowman, 135 Idaho at 845, 25 P.3d at 868. Idaho Code§§
49-324 and 49-326 focus on the "offenses" "committed." "Commit" is defined as, "to perpetrate (a
crime)." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). "Perpetrate" is defined as "to commit or carry out
(an act, esp. a crime)." Id. "Offense is defined as "a violation of the law." Id. In focusing on the
offense committed, the legislature intended that the Department look at the underlying acts of the
law violation, not the form of the conviction especially considering a person may commit an act,
but a person cannot commit a conviction. See Idaho Code§ 49-324 ("if committed in this state,
would be grounds for ... ").
Additionally, a second DUI is not a separate and distinct offense than a first DUI. Both are a
DUI offenses and the number of previous DUis only affects the enhancement of the penalties in
criminal cases. In State v. Schall,

Idaho 488, _ , 337 P.3d 647,651 (2014), the Supreme Court
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addressed whether I 8-8005(6) (third or subsequent DUI) constituted a separate and distinct offense
or consisted of enhancement provisions. The

looked at

section

"Penalties," and 18-

8005(8), which characterizes subsections 4, 6, and 9 as "enhancement[s]," and determined, along
with other reasons, that the provision for third or subsequent DUI was an enhancement provision
and not a separate and distinct offense. Id. at 651-52. The Court made clear ''that in a prosecution
pursuant to Idaho Code section 18-8005(6) [for a third or subsequent DUI] the offense at issue is
the violation ofldaho Code section 18-8004 [DUI] and that very offense may be charged either as a
misdemeanor or a felony depending upon the defendant's prior criminal history." Id. at 652.
Therefore, the DUI is the offense and whether it is a first, second, or third DUI does not constitute
different offenses but only affects the sentencing in criminal cases.
The legislature intended that the Department focus on the offense-the DUI-and not the
sentencing enhancements from the foreign jurisdiction. This is made clear by the emphasis on
"offense" "committed" in the statutes, as opposed to the "sentences imposed" or the "form of the
judgment." Additionally, other portions of the statutes support this view of focusing on the act, or
offense, rather than the sentence or form of judgment. As the statutes read, any administrative
action or court order evidencing the offense committed is sufficient for suspending a person's
license in Idaho. For example, if a foreign jurisdiction had the same statutes as Idaho and a driver
had his or her license suspended by an agency similar to the Department, that suspension would
serve as sufficient evidence to take action against the driver under Idaho Code§§ 49-324 and 49326--regardless of whether a conviction existed or the form of the conviction. Therefore, the
legislature intended that the Department focus on the offense-the DUI-and not the form of the
conviction when suspending driver's licenses in Idaho.
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Finally,

interpretation is contrary to the purpose of the administrative suspension

statutes. "When

a statute, [the courts are to] construe

statute as a whole to give

effect to the legislative intent." Bowman, 135 Idaho at 845, 25 P.3d at 868. The purpose of the
administrative license suspension statutes is "to provide maximum safety for all persons using the
highways of this state by quickly revoking the driving privileges of those persons" who drive under
the influence. Id. at 846, 25 P.3d at 869. Idaho laws dictate that when a person commits more than
one DUI within a certain period of time, that person's driving privileges will be suspended for a
period of one year to protect the public. See Idaho Code§§ 18-8002A(2)(d) and 18-8005(4). One
could imagine the confusion that would ensue and how the purpose of these statutes would be
frustrated if the Department was limited to the form of a foreign conviction, not the offense or acts,
given that each state has differing versions of DUI laws and punishment enhancements.
Interpretations that provide drivers a "free bite," such as the one Warner proposes, are
contrary to the purpose of the statutes. In Bowman, a driver was arrested for a DUI and submitted a
blood test. Id. at 844, 25 P.3d at 867. Approximately one month later, before the blood test results
were received, the driver was again arrested for a DUI but this time provided a breath test. Id.
Having failed the breath test, the Department suspended his driver's license for ninety days. Id.
When the blood test results were completed, showing that the driver's BAC from the first arrest
was .19, the Department issued a notice that the driver's suspension would be for one year. Id. After
the driver unsuccessfully challenged the notice at a hearing, the district court reversed the one-year
suspension and implemented a ninety-day suspension. Id. The Department appealed. Id.
The issue on appeal was the interpretation of the phrase, "failure of evidentiary testing." Id.
at 845, 25 P.3d at 868. Tne Court found that ;'evidentiary testing refers to the completed series of
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procedures" to determine the BAC and therefore the driver had not failed the evidentiary testing
the testing was completed.

at 846,

P.3d at 869.

interpreting the statute, the Court

stated, "Both test results indicated that Bowman had been driving on two separate occasions while
his blood-alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit" and that the driver's one-year license
suspension was proper, reversing the district court. Id. After ruling, the Court noted that its
interpretation of the statute "complies with the legislative purpose underlying the administrative
license suspension statute ... [which is] to provide maximum safety for all person using the
highways" by revoking the licenses of intoxicated drivers. Id. The Court commented that the
driver's interpretation of the statute "would allow a person to avoid a one-year suspension although
alcohol concentration tests indicate that the person was driving under the influence on two separate
occasions within a five-year period." Id. at 847, 25 P.3d at 870. The Court stated that such a "free
bite" "would contradict the legislative purpose underlying" the administrative license suspensions.

Id.
The purpose of the requirement of a conviction, administrative decision, or court order from
a foreign jurisdiction is so that the Department's decision to suspend a driver's license is to ensure
that the decision is supported by reliable evidence, not to base the suspension off how the foreign
jurisdiction charged and convicted the driver. The purpose of the statutes is effectuated when the
facts underlying the conviction, which constitutes the offense, are used in the suspension, and not
the form of the conviction. Warner's interpretation would permit a "free bite" and contradict the
legislative purposes of the statutes.
Warner's acts mandate a one year license suspension. Warner drove under the influence in
Montana. Warner previously drove under the influence in 2012. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-
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8005(4), Warner would be subject, had she committed the offense in Idaho, to a one-year license
suspension.
B. Warner seeks a reduced license suspension because the offense was committed in
Montana.

While Warner argues that imposing a one-year license suspension for the Montana DUI would
subject Warner to a harsher penalty than had she committed the act in Idaho, the opposite is trueWarner is seeking a reduced consequence because the offense was committed in Montana.
Had Warner committed the Montana DUI in Idaho, she would have been subject to Idaho Code
§ 18-8002A. That statute gives authority to the Department to suspend the driving privileges of a
person who commits a DUI in Idaho. The statute also reads that if the present DUI is the second DUI
within five years, then the license suspension would be for one year. Therefore, had Warner committed
the act of driving while under the influence in Idaho, instead of Montana, she would have been given a
one-year suspension regardless of whether the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a
criminal case or whether that offense resulted in a conviction of a second DUI, first DUI, or even a
reckless driving charge.

In fact, Idaho Code§ 18-8002A serves, in and ofitself, as grounds to suspend Warner's driving
privileges for one year. Idaho Code§ 18-8002A(4)(a)(ii) provides that when a person is found to be
driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004, the
Department is to suspend the person's driver's license for a period of one year if it is the second such
occasion within five years. Idaho Code§§ 49-324 mandates that the Department suspend the driver's
license of individuals if the offense for which they were convicted were committed in Idaho would be
"grounds" for the suspension. "Grounds" does not require a criminal statute or a penalty associated with
a corresponding crime. Idaho Code§ 18-8002A would serve as "grounds" under Idaho Code§ 49-324
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and,hadthe

occurred in Idaho, W amer' s driver's license would have been suspended pursuant to
18-8002A.

However, despite the fact that had Warner committed the DUI in Idaho she would be subject to
a one-year suspension, W amer argues that she should not be subject to a one-year suspension because
she was not convicted of a second offense DUI in Montana. In simple terms-Wamer wants a shorter
suspension because the offense occurred in Montana. Such a position is an attempt to take advantage of
the differences between the DUI laws in Montana and Idaho.
Montana's DUI laws are very different than Idaho's. Compare I.C. § 18-8001 et seq. and
Montana Code Annotated ("MCA") § 61-8-40 I et seq. As noted above, each state has an enhancement
for a DUI based upon an excessive BAC, with Idaho drawing the line at .20 and Montana drawing the
line at .16. Compare I.C. § I8-8004C with MCA§ 61-8-465(1). While both states have graduated
penalties based upon how many prior DUis have been committed by a criminal defendant, those
divisions differ considerably. Compare LC.§ 18-8005 with MCA§§ 61-8-714 and 61-8-722. One of
the notable differences is how prior DUis are tabulated. For example, in Idaho, a conviction under 188004( 1) (a), (b ), and (c), along with "substantially conforming foreign criminal violation(s)" within the
past 10 years are considered when determining whether the present DUI is a second DUI. LC. § 188005(4 ). In Montana, all prior Montana convictions are considered, regardless of when it occurred, and
foreign DUis appear to be excluded from consideration. See MCA § 61-8-714(2)(a) ("a person
convicted of a second violation of 61-8-40 I ... ); MCA § 61-8-401 (declaring it unlawful to operate a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol "upon the way of this state open to the public").
W amer is seeking to have a reduced license suspension because the offense occurred outside
Idaho's borders. However, as Idaho Code §§ 49-324 and 49-326 state, the license suspension is to
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reflect as though the offense occurred
would be suspended

Idaho. Had the offense occurred in Idaho, Warner's license

one year.

C. The license suspension does not violate Warner's right to travel.
Warner alleges that the license suspension violates her right to travel. "The suspension or
revocation of driving privileges does not limit the right to travel, merely the means .... Suspension of
driving privileges may make travel less convenient. There is no constitutional infringement, however."

State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 172, 125 P.3d 522,528 (2005). Warner's driver's license suspension
does not violate her right to travel.

D. The suspension is independent of the criminal action.
In her brief, Warner appears to argue that the administrative driver's license suspension is tied
to and contingent upon the criminal proceedings. On page 4 of her brief, Warner argues that
No matter how many prior convictions a person may have within the previous ten
years, if that person is sentenced for a first offense driving under the influence
conviction, the license suspension under Idaho law is for thirty-day absolute
suspension, followed by sixty days of restricted driving privileges. LC. §18-8005( 1)(d).
Warner also argues
There is no question that a person who is convicted of a second offense DUI within
Idaho shall have her privileges suspended for one year, with no restricted permit. See,
LC.§ 18-8005(4)(e) ("Shall have his driving privileges suspended by the court for an
additionaly mandatory minimum period of one (I) year after release from confinement,
during which one (1) year period absolutely no driving privileges of any kind may be
granted."). But Ms. Warner was not convicted of a second offense DUI in Montana.
Petitioner's Brief, p. 5. In disputing the one year suspension, Warner concludes, "To permit otherwise
would impose sentences greater than the maximum permitted by Idaho law and would deny defendants
the benefits of their bargains in the criminal courts." (Emphasis added). It is clear that Warner treats the
license suspension as though it is a punishment, tied to the criminal case and having criminal
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proceeding implications.
administrative

license suspensions are

in nature--entirely independent

of the criminal proceedings. As noted above, the Department can suspend a license regardless of
whether the offense committed results in a conviction for a DUL
The Idaho Court of Appeals has addressed the civil nature of administrative driver's license
suspensions. J.n Buell v. Idaho Department ofTransportation, 151 Idaho 257, 259, 254 P.3d 1253, 125 5
(Ct. App. 2011), a driver was charged with a DUI after refusing to take a BAC test. The driver pled
guilty to a DUI and, pursuant to the plea agreement, the BAC refusal matter was dismissed. Id. At
sentencing the court suspended the driver's noncommercial driver's license for a period of ninety days.

Id. The Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD") sent the driver a letter, giving him notice that his
CDL was disqualified for one year. Id. The driver appealed, arguing that the suspension ofhis CDL was
so punitive that it was effectively a criminal penalty and the suspension would violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution, subjecting the driver to multiple punishments for the same offense.

Id. at 260,254 P.3d at 1256.

J.n rejecting the driver's arguments, the Court noted that "the state's interest in preventing
intoxicated person from driving far outweighs the individual's interest.. ." and that "the state has a
strong remedial and nonpunitive reason for suspending driver's licenses." Id. at 263, 254 P .3d at 1259.
The Court recognized that administrative suspensions "also serve to provide for the safety ofthe public
at-large." Id. The Court stated that "Idaho appellate courts have not viewed driver's license suspensions
as punishment." Id. Despite the CDL suspension taking place outside of the driver's criminal sentence
and that sentencing having taken place in Idaho, the Court affirmed the suspension as it was civil in
nature and unrelated to the criminal punishment. Id. at 260,264,254 P.3d at 1257, 1261.
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Similarly, the Department was authorized to suspend Warner's license despite the criminal case
and without regard to the criminal proceedings and charge. It does not matter whether Warner
was convicted of a first offense DUI, second offense DUI, or aggravated DUI in Montana. The driver's
license suspension is civil, not criminal, and operates independently of the criminal action, including
any deal or negotiation between Warner and the prosecuting jurisdiction, or how the prosecuting
jurisdiction decides to prosecute the charge. All that matters is that the Montana conviction
demonstrates the offense-that Warner was driving while under the influence-and with that, the
Department is to suspend her license according to how many DUI violations she had.
The emphasis and reliance Warner puts on the Montana criminal case is misplaced.
E. Warner is not entitled to attorney's fees or costs.
Warner asks this Court to award attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117.
That code section allows for the award of costs and fees against a nonprevailing party when that
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Warner's request should be denied
for two reasons.
First, Warner is not the prevailing party. As shown above, the Department was not only
authorized to suspend Warner's license for one year, it was required to do so. Second, Warner has not
demonstrated, or even argued, that the Department acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact. As
demonstrated above, the Department was acting under expressly granted authority, provided in two
different statutes (Idaho Code §§ 49-324 and 49-326), and had two separate bases under which to
suspend the license for one year (Idaho Code§§ 18-8002A and 18-8005). Warner did not contest the
finding that she, in fact, operated a motor vehicle while having a BAC of .176 and had a prior DUI
from 2012. Therefore, the Department had reasonable basis in fact and iaw to suspend Warner's

-
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costs and
VI.

-

CONCLUSION

For the second time in less than t'vVO years, Wa..'"Iler operated a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol. Based upon the facts gleaned from her Montana aggravated DUI conviction, the
Department was required to suspend Warner's license for one year. Warner is not entitled to a reduced
license suspension simply because Montana chose not to categorize and prosecute the offense as a
second violation. The Court should affirm the Department and deny the Petition.
DATED this 27th day of March, 2014.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
Respondent argues that the one year suspension is warranted because the

Department has an almost unfettered right to suspend a person's driving privileges when
that suspension is based upon an out-of-state conviction. In doing so, Respondent ignores
the limits placed upon the Department for a violation committed within the state.
However, as demonstrated in the Petitioner's Opening Brief and below, that position is
-

neither supported by the applicable statutes nor the case law. 1

-

2.

RESPONDENT MISINTERPRETS THE APPLICABLE STATUTES
Respondent argues the legislative history of the statute allows the Department to

look at the "facts underlying the conviction" from another state, rather than the nature of
the conviction itself. (See Respondent's Brief, hereinafter RB, at 8.) This argument must
be rejected for two reasons; first, the hearing officer did not look at the "facts underlying
the conviction," but only at the fact that there was a conviction for a DUI in Montana; and
second, since the statute is not ambiguous on its face, there is no need to look at the
"legislative intent."2 (Cf. RB 8.)
1

There is no dispute about the standard of review. This Court shall overturn the
agency's determination if it finds that the decision is "(a) in violation of constitutional or
statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon
unlawful procedure; or (d) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." LC. § 675279(3).
2

Even if there was a reason to look at the legislative intent, Respondent makes no
showing by reference to legislative history, that his proposed interpretation of the
legislative intent is correct. Why would the legislature want the Department to examine
the facts underlying each out-of-state conviction in order to determine the proper

l
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First, the Department's suspension was based only on the fact that Ms. Warner was
a DUI

Montana. (See, Agency Record, hereinafter "AR;' at 2 and

Ms. Warner originally argued that the Department was basing its suspension on the
Montana equivalent of an excessive DUI in Idaho. See, LC. § l 8-8004C. As a result,
Ms. Warner provided proof that her BAC was below the standard set forth in the Idaho
statute. There would have been no argument about a one year suspension if she had been
-

charged and convicted of having more than a .20 BAC because under Idaho law, her
license would be suspended for one year.
Second, because the Department did not look at the "facts underlying offense" in
rejecting Ms. Warner's challenge, but based its decision on the existence of the Montana
conviction, in conjunction with the prior Idaho violation, the Department cannot now seek
to justify its suspension on other grounds.
Third, the applicable statutes are clear and unambiguous - the Department has the
authority to suspend a license "upon receiving notice of the conviction, administrative
action, or court order ... of an offense, which if committed in Idaho, would be grounds
for suspension...." LC. § 49-324. Additionally, the Department may suspend if a
driver "has committed an offense in another state or jurisdiction as evidenced by a

suspension, when the Department is not permitted to look at the "underlying facts" for in
state convictions?

2
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or administrative action, which
for suspension. . ."

committed

Idaho

§ 49-326(l)(e) (emphasis added).

These statutes provide the sole authority for the Department to impose a
suspension in this case, and Ms. Warner has not contested that the Department has the
"authority" to suspend her license. What is at issue is the lengt.h of the suspension and
these statutes permit a suspension only for the term permitted by Idaho law, "if the
-

[crime] was committed in Idaho."

In order to avoid the statutes' clear language, the Department wants this Court to
ignore the basis for the suspension here - the fact that Ms. Warner was convicted of a
first offense violation in Montana. The argument about another suspension being
evidenced by a "court order or administrative action," is misplaced here. Certainly, had
Ms. Warner received an "administrative action" from Montana suspending her license
based on failing an evidentiary test, Idaho could use that as a basis for an equivalent
suspension in Idaho. But the Department suspended her license upon receiving notice of
her "conviction," not because of any administrative action. (AR at 2.)
Indeed, the parties do not dispute the fact of the conviction for DUI is the sole
basis of the suspension. (See, RB at 9.) And the parties do not dispute that the length of
a suspension is limited by LC.§ 18-8005. (See RB at 8-9.) Moreover, Respondent's
reliance on State v. Schall, 337 P.3d 647 (2014) only reinforces Petitioner's argument
regarding the limitation on the length of any suspension based on DUI convictions. In

3

Schall, the Supreme Court examined the issue of whether a defendant could challenge the
existence of a prior conviction at a preliminary hearing. The court determined that a
challenge at that time was not permitted. However, the court held that a defendant was
not without a remedy to challenge a prior conviction in district court after preliminary
hearing.

-

Finally, this result does not leave a defendant without recourse to challenge
the felony enhancement once in district court. A defendant can do so in
either of two ways. First, a defendant can move in limine to strike the
felony enhancement. See, e.g., State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho 800, 801, 172
P.3d 555, 556 (Ct. App. 2007) (defendant moved in limine to strike a felony
enhancement because the foreign DUI statute allegedly failed to conform to
Idaho's DUI statute). Second, the defendant may object to the admissibility
of evidence purporting to establish that a foreign conviction is substantially
conforming. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 892, 231 P .3d 532,
537 (Ct. App. 2010) (considering defendant's argument that the district
court improperly admitted evidence, over the defendant's objection,
concerning foreign convictions). Both alternatives were available to Schall.

Id. at 655.
Additionally, if a defendant successfully challenges a prior conviction, neither the
court nor the Department can impose a sentence longer than that authorized by LC.§ 188005. In State v. Halford, 124 Idaho 411, 860 P.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1993), a defendant who
had two prior convictions but entered a plea to the charge of a first offense, unenhanced
DUI, was sentenced to a suspension greater than permitted by LC. § 18-8005. The trial
court imposed a sentence greater than the maximum for a first offense, including a one

-

year license suspension. On appeal, the sentence was reversed: "We hold only that in the
proper exercise of its sentencing discretion, the trial court must confine itself to the
4
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maximum penalty for the offense to which the defendant pied guilty." Id. at 414.
Thus, if Ms. Warner had been convicted of the first offense Montana charge Ln the
State of Idaho, the court and the Department could only treat her as a first time offender
and impose the maximum suspension set forth in LC. § 18-8005(1 ). And this is all Ms.
W amer has been seeking throughout the proceedings in the Department and before this
Court.

-

3.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE DEPARTMENT CAN
ADMINISTRATIVELY SUSPEND MS. WARNER'S LICENSE WITHOUT
LIMITS MUST BE REJECTED
Respondent first argues that Ms. Warner's license could have been suspended

administratively under LC. § 18-8002A. The Court must reject this argument for two
reasons: first, the Department never notified Ms. Warner that her license was being
suspended under this section, thereby violating her right to due process of law under the State
and Federal Constitutions, see, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) and State v.
Morgan, 154 Idaho 109,294 P.3d 1121 (2013); and second, there is no proof that the State

-

complied with the prerequisites set forth in section l 8-8002A(2) for a proper administrative
license suspension under this section.
On appeal, a party cannot change the playing field and raise new issues not
presented below. The Department notified Ms. Warner of her suspension based only on
her Montana conviction. (AR at 2.) The hearing officer found that despite the fact that
her conviction in Montana was for a first offense violation, the Department could

5
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consider her prior Idaho offense under section 18-8005 and impose a one-year
(AR

Raising the issue of another ground

the suspension for the

first time on appeal is not permitted. See, e.g., Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 151 Idaho 932,
265 P.3d 1144 (2011).
Even if the Department was able to raise this argument here, the record contains no
evidence that Ms. Warner was advised pursuant to section 18-8002A(2) and therefore the
license suspension cannot be upheld.
Thus, Respondent's argument that Ms. Warner is seeking a lesser suspension
"because the offense was committed in Montana" (RB at 12) must be rejected. She seeks
only to have the same suspension imposed as if she was convicted of a first offense in

-

Idaho. See, State v. Halford, supra.
4.

RESPONDENT'S RELIANCE ON THE COMMERCIAL DRIVER LICENSE
STATUTE MUST BE REJECTED
Respondent next argues that the Department has the administrative authority to

suspend a license, separate and distinct from the imposition of a court suspension, relying
on a case interpreting the rules related to commercial licenses. (RB 14-16, citing Buell v.
Idaho Department of Transportation, 151 Idaho 257,254 P.3d 1253 (Ct. App. 2011).)

However, Respondent's reliance on this distinct statute regulating commercial drivers is
misplaced.
First, the Legislature had set forth a specific license suspension for a commercial
license upon a conviction of a specific crime. See, LC. § 49-335. The Department itself
6
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did not create the length or basis for the suspension of a commercial license and this
statute has no impact on a non-commercial license to operate a motor vehicle. See,

§

49-105(16). Also, the length of the suspension must be based on the fact of the
conviction. Thus, in Buell, the sole question was whether this statute violated the double
jeopardy clause of the State and Federal Constitutions. Ms. Warner has never argued that
the Department's suspension of her license runs afoul of the double jeopardy clauses or
that the Department has no authority to impose some license suspension. Her argument
has always been that under the applicable statutes, the Department is limited to the length
of the suspension based upon a conviction of a first offense DUI, in Idaho.
Second, Respondent can point to no statute which permits the Department to
impose a one year suspension solely because it examined its own records to locate a prior
offense. If Respondent's bootstrapping argument that the Department has the right to
suspend for a period of time greater than that set forth in I.C. § 18-8005 is accepted, there
would be no limit on the scope of the suspension imposed by the Department for
defendants who are convicted within Idaho. But as the hearing officer recognized, the
sole authority to suspend Ms. Warner's license is found in sections 49-326 and 18-8005.
The Department has pointed to no case where it imposed a greater suspension than
ordered by an Idaho court upon a conviction for a first offense, even if the defendant had
uncharged or dismissed prior convictions. Cf., State v. Halford, supra, (limiting
suspension to maximum provided by statute).

7
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5.

MS. WARNER'S RIGHT TO TRAVEL WAS VIOLATED
Respondent argues

a license suspension does not violate the constitutional

right to travel, citing State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 125 P.3d 522 (2005). (See RB 14.)
However, Respondent's reliance on Bennett is misplaced. There the defendant argued
that a suspension authorized by statute and imposed upon a valid conviction did not
violate the right to travel, a claim rejected by the court which stated:
The suspension or revocation of driving privileges does not limit the right to
travel, merely the means. Typically punishments interfere with travel. Jail
prevents it. Fines limit the opportunity in some instances. Suspension of
driving privileges may make travel less convenient. There is no
constitutional infringement, however.

Id. at 172.
Ms. Warner is not arguing a license suspension in and of itself violates the right to
travel, as she has conceded that a shorter suspension is proper here. Rather she claims
that imposing a greater suspension based solely on her out-of-state travel creates the
constitutional violation. The violation is found in the Department's claim that it has the
ability to impose double the suspension on her only because her conviction occurred
outside the state. This double standard creates the infringement on her right to travel. All
she asks is that she be treated, as the applicable statutes require, equally with the person
who is convicted of the same crime in Idaho.

8
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....
CONCLUSION
the foregoing reasons and those set forth

the Opening Brief, Ms. Warner

respectfully requests that this Court set aside the one-year suspension and order that the
Department may only impose a license suspension for a first offense DUI if committed
within the State ofidaho, with credit for the time before Ms. Warner's license suspension
was stayed. Further, as the prevailing party, it is requested that the Court award
reasonable attorneys fees and costs to Ms. Warner.
Dated thisJbl day of April, 2015.

~.0vL
k<lrew Parnes
Attorney for Petitioner

-

9
79

DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I, Emily Dion, declare:

I am employed in the County of Blaine, State ofldaho. I am over the age of
eighteen years and not a party to this action. My business address is 671 First Avenue
North, Ketchum, ID 83340.
On April

3, 2015, I served the within:
Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review

by placing two true copies thereof in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully

prepaid, in the United States mail at Ketchum, Idaho, addressed as follows:
TIMOTHY J. STOVER
Special Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
905 Shoshone Street North
P.O. Box 1428

Twin Falls, Idaho 8 3 3 0 3 - 1 2 4 ~ - - - E~

10

80

04-07-'15 15:00 FROM-WF

LLC

208-736-9929

LA WREN CE
WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho

T-011 P0002/0003 F-843

APR - 7 2015

Timothy J. Stover
Special Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
905 Shoshone Street North

P.O. Box 1428
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1248
Telephone: (208) 736-9900
Facsimile: (208) 736-9929
[SB #4842

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
**** *

SUSAN JANE WARNER,
Petitioner,

v.

)

)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

)
)

Respondent.

)

Case No. CV 2014-784

NOTICE OF ORAL ARGUMENT

)

COMES NOW, Timothy J. Stover, counsel of record for Respondent State of Idaho,
Department of Transportation and advises this Court that all briefing ordered in this matter has been

filed and/or all deadlines for briefing have now passed. Therefore, Respondent hereby requests oral
argument pursuant to Rule 84(q) to be heard before the Honorable Robert J. Elgee in the District

NOTICE OF ORAL ARGUMENT· 1
81

04-07- 15 15:00 FROM-WF
1

LLC

208-736-9929

Courtroom of the Blaine County Courthouse, 201

2nd

Avenue South, Hailey, Idaho, on the

of May, 2015, at 11:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as""'""""' can
DATED this

T-011 P0003/0003 F-843

4th

day

heard.

'1-t:., day of April, 2015.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the~ day of April, 2015, he caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following manner:
Andrew Parnes
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile
(208) 726-1187

NOTICE OF ORAL ARGUMENT· 2
82

04-22-'15
,,

:21 FROM-WF

LLC

208-736-9929

T-027 P0002/0008 F-857

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho

APR 22 2015

Timothy J. Stover
Special Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
905 Shoshone Street North
P.O. Box 1428
Twin Falls, ID 83303- 1428
Telephone: (208) 736-9900
Facsimile: (208) 736-9929
ISB #4842

~11r;nanlf!I
- ~ ·Cou
a.rt Di6trict
lelaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
*****
SUSAN JANE WARNER,

Petitioner,
V.

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2014-784
RESPONDENT'S
AUGMENTATION OF BRIEF

COMES NOW the Respondent, the State of Idaho Depa1tment of Transportation
("Department"), by and through its counsel of record, Special Deputy Attomey General Timothy J.
Stover, and hereby submits the following supplemental persuasive authority pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(r)
and LA.R. 34(t)(l).

RESPONDENT'S AUGMENTATlON OF BfUEF - I
83

15:22 FROM-WFS

LC

208-736-9929

T-027 ?0003/0008 F-857

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of a decision issued by the Honorable D. DuffMcKee in
situation as this case. The entire Memorandum

Decision applies to sections V. A and V. D (pages 7-12, 14-16) of Respondent's Brief.
DATED this 22nd day of April, 2014.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on the 22nd day of April, 2014, he caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following manner:
ANDREW PARNES
671 First Avenue North

P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, Id 83340

(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(x) Facsimile
(208) 726-1187

RESPONDENT'S AUGMENTATION OF BR1EF - 2
84

04-22- ' 15 15 : 22 FROM-\liF-

LC

T-027 P0004/0008 F-857

208-736-9929

·'

HO
UI

(Y

:B5~$ ~--S

rm
~l.fiCTION

IN TH! DISTRICT COURT OP THE FOUR'ffl JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATB Of' IDIJIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

DAVID PAUL BAUMGART
Petitioner,

Cue No, CV OC 08 06504

VI,

IDAHO TRANSPORTATION
DSPARTMENT

MEMORANDUM DECJS(ON

Respondent.

This cue ia before tho courc on ptlirion ror judicial mlew from an adtnihimalive
dri\'cr's li""'e suspenaionorder cmtm:d by the Idaho Transportation DcpartmeL the
issue presented hu been fully hriefcd and lhc cue has boon submitted (or da:iaian

withowt oral argumenr.

Issue Pracated

.

Tho solo isauc presented in this cue is whether a jl&dlfflCllt of conviction of
clri\linll under the influence o( alcohol in another slate lhat is denominated • "fiffl

offense.. cindet lhat staae•s DUI laws can be c:onsideM a second offinlo in this state for
the purpose or"' admini11na1ivc license suSpcnsion proc:Slding in Idaho.

For reasons

111tcd. I conclude th11 it c:an. and I afflnn lhe otdc:r or suspension in this cue.
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Facts and Procedural History

The facts are not disputed. Baumgart, a resident of Idaho and the holder of an
Idaho driver's license, was convicted in Idaho of driving under the influence of alcohol in
Au1us1 of 2007. For purposes here, this was Baumgart's admitted 04first offense."
In September of 2007, he was arrested in Nebraska and charged with driving
under the influence there. On January s. 2008, he submitted a ''Plea In Absentia,"
apparently pursuant to a plea agreement with the county attorney in Nebraska. pleading
guilty to 41 Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol - First Offense." This plea was

ac<:eptcd by the court jn Nebraska and he was duly sentenced in a manner consistent with
a first offense conviction.

rn duo course. the Nebraska authorlliC$ notified the [daho Transportation
Department of the Nebraska proceedings. The ITD promptly notified Baumgart that hi5
ldaho driver's license would be administratively suspended in Idaho for a period of one

year, on the basis that the Nebraska DUI conviction was his "second offense within ten
0

years, and as is proscribed by I.C. § 18-8004 and 18-SOOS.
Baumgart requested a hearing. The hearing officer, notwithstanding the terms of
the plea agreement and plea in Nebraska, concluded that the conviction there WIIS his
second conviction. and therefore the one year suspension was appropriate under the fdaho

statutes.
Baumgart filed a timely appeal to this court.

Analysis
The Idaho starute in question reads as follows:

t.C. § 49·324. Suspending resident's license 11nd privileges upon
c:onvictlon. adminlstratiYe action or court erder In another state or

Memorandum Decision
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Jurisdlcden. - The depanment shall suapcnd, disqualify or revoke the
driver's license or privilege of any resident of this state or the privilege
of a nonresident to operate a motor vehicle in this state upon receiving
notice of the conviction. administrative action or court order of that
person in another state or jurisdiction of an offense which, if committed
in this state, would be grounds for the suspension. disqualification or
revocation of the drivers license and privileges of the driver. The
department ihall forward a certified copy or electronic transfer to the
national driver register.
Baumgart argues that the plea in Nebraska was for a "first offense,'' which in

Idaho would only result in a lesser license suspension. with the possibility of some
privileges. He argues that the ITO cannot consider the Nebraska conviction as a "second

offense" .in order to bring this case wi1hin lhc reach of I.C. § t8-8005(4), which mandates
an absolute one year suspension, with no exceptions. upon a second conviction within ten

years.
I am not persuaded. The basic DUI statutes are essentially identical between
Idaho and Nebraska. Neither of the basic statutes against driving while intoxicated makes
any distinction between first and subsequent offenses. The only distirletion in Idaho
between first and subsequent offenses comes in another statute pertaining to the penalty
that might be imposed - J.C. § 18-8005. Here, that Baumgart's offense was treated by

the Nebraska court as a first offense for sentencing purposes does not change the basic
fact that Baumgart was arrested and convicted for DUl in Nebraska within ten years of
his arrest and conviction in Idaho of essentially the same offense.
To state my conclusion another way, I.C. § 49-324, the enabling statute
authorizing administrative 1icense suspensions in Idaho for offenses committed
elsewhere, is governed by the operative provisions of the foreign state's laws penaining
to the crimes described therein. The authority granted by this section is not limited or

Memorandum Decision

Page·· 3

87

'15

FROM-WFS

LC

208-736-9929

T-027 P0007/0008 F-857

connected to any sentencing provision in the foreign s,11te. Here, there is no dispute Chat
the Nebraska DUI statute under which Baumgart was arrested and convicted was

essentially the same as that of Idaho in its operative parts. It is not disputed that this was,
in fact. Baumgart's second conviction within ten years. Whether the Nebraska authorities
knew of the Idaho conviction is irrelevant The fact that Nebraska called it a "first
offense" is irrelevant. None or these considerations limit the administrative authority of
the ITD in an administrative license suspension proceeding upon learning of the
circumstance ofBaumgart's second DUI conviction within ten years.
Conclusion
There is no reason to disturb the findings and order of the hearing officer in lhis

cue. and the resultant final order of the Idaho Transportation Department. The final order
is affinned in all respects. The stay order htretofore entered is vacated.
Dated tbisZ.-i~ay of September, 2008.

':::::::':::,..
Sr. Judge D. Duff McKee
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CERTIFICATE OP MAILINO

I hereby certify that on this 24111 day of September, 2008, I mailed (served) a true and
com::ct copy of the within instnimen, to:
I.arty D. Scou
SCOTT & HACKNEY, PU.C

SOO W Bannock
Boise, ID 83702

J. Timothy Thomas
IDAHO ATt'ORNBY GENERAL'S OFFICE

POBoit 7129
Boise, ID 83707-1129
J. DAV1D NAVARRO
Clerk of the Di ·ct Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

COURT MINUTES
CV-2014-0000784
Susan Jane Lauer vs. State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation
Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled
Hearing date: 5/4/2015
Time: 10:59 am
Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation, Attorney: Timothy Stover
Party: Susan Lauer, Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Counter#
Counsel present.
11.06
Court introduces the case.
11.07
Mr. Parnes present exhibit -briefs
Court had exhibit marked as Petitioner's Exh. A- ADMITTED.
Mr. Parnes begins oral argument.
Court inquires about suspensions.
11.18
Mr. Parnes responds and continues.
Court inquires about conviction.
11.34
Mr. Parnes responds.
Mr. Stover responds.
Court inquires.
11.49
Mr. Stover responds.
Mr. Parnes responds.
11.58
12.17
Court comments.
Mr. Stover comments
Mr. Parnes responds.
12.20
Court takes the matter under advisement and will issue a written decision.
12.24
Mr. Stover comments.
Mr. Parnes comments.
Recess
12.26
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

Susan Jane Warner,

)
) Case No. CV-2014-784

Petitioner,

)

) DECISION ON APPEAL
vs.

State of Idaho Department of
Transportation,

)
)
)
)

)

Respondent.

)

PROCEDURAL IDSTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Appearances:
For Petitioner, Susan Jane Warner: Andrew Parnes, Ketchum.
For Respondent, State ofidaho Department of Transportation: Timothy Stover and Kirk
Melton, Twin Falls.
On April 5, 2012 Susan Warner, hereinafter Warner, was cited for Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol-2nd Offense, in violation of Montana Code Annotated §61 - 8-401(1)(a)
after being involved in a single car accident and submitting to a breath test and subsequent blood
1
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draw. Amended Agency Record, hereinafter AAR, p. 35-38. Warner previously was convicted
in Idaho

resulting in Montana citing her for a second DUL Id. at 8. The breath

test resulted in a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .179 while the blood draw revealed a BAC of
.176. Id. On July 23, 2014, the State of Montana amended the charge against Warner to
Aggravated DUI, in violation of MCA§ 61-8-465(1)(a), driving with a blood alcohol
concentration in excess of 0.16 or more and dropping the "2°d" notation. Id. at 22. Warner pled
guilty to the amended charge and was sentenced on September 16, 2014. Id. at 21. The
conviction and sentence in Montana was not for a second offense and the sentencing court did
not suspend Warner's license. Id. There has been no argument that the Montana code is not
substantially conforming, except as to the BAC required for an aggravated DUI. This Court does
find that the Montana statute is substantially conforming, except as to the Montana provisions
regarding aggravated DUI. 1
After receiving notice of the conviction from the State of Montana, the Idaho
Transportation Department (hereinafter Department) sent Warner notification of a one year
absolute suspension of her Idaho driving privileges on September 23, 2014, with the suspension
effective on October 9, 2014. Id. at 2-3. Warner contested the length of the suspension on
October 1, 2014. Id. at 5. A hearing was held on October 16, 2014 and the hearing officer
upheld the suspension on October 31, 2014. Id. at 25-27. Warner filed a Petition for

1It is self-evident from the citation and record that Warner's Montana DUI could have been considered a z"d under
Montana's statutory scheme regardless of whether Montana reviews the prior 10 years of a person's driving
record or some other number of years.

2
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Reconsideration. Id. at 30-34. The hearing officer denied the petition on November 15, 2014.
at

Warner filed this Petition for Judicial Review on December 4, 2014.

at 43.

Importantly, the issue on appeal is not whether Warner's license may be suspended (she
concedes it can), but the length of the suspension.2

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Court may overturn an agency's decision only when the agency's findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by
substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC.

§ 67-5279(3).

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Can the Department Administratively Suspend Warner's License for a Period of One
Year Pursuant to LC.§ 18-8002A.

2

Likewise, both parties agree that I.C. § 49-324 and/or I.C. § 49-326 permit the Department to suspend Warner's
license.

3

93

Without the benefit of

§ 18-8002A to suspend Warner's license for l year, can the

Department apply the penalties for a second offense DUI pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(e)
regardless of the form of the conviction?

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

1.

Can the Department Administratively Suspend Warner's License for a Period of One
Year Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002(A).

The State argued in its brief and at oral argument that had Warner been driving in the
State ofldaho, her license would have been suspended almost immediately by the Department
after they received notice from the peace officer of Warner's failed test pursuant to I.C. §188002A, for a period of one year. Warner asserts that any argument by the State pertaining to I.C.
§ l 8-8002A must be rejected because (i) the issue was not presented below and (ii) even if this
Court does consider I.C. § 18-8002A, there has been no showing that the requirements of this
statute have been met for the Department to administratively suspend Warner's license for
failing an evidentiary test in Montana. The Department's argument regarding LC. §18-8002A is
in response to Petitioner's Equal Protection argument; specifically, that Warner is requesting
favorable treatment (not equal treatment) because if she had been stopped in Idaho her license
would have been automatically suspended much sooner and for a period of one year. The Court
will address this issue directly.

4
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1.

~~u,~,

~

The State has not raised the issue of a license suspension pursuant to LC. § 18-

until this appeal. Specifically, the 'Notice of Suspension' sent to Warner on September

23, 2014 states "according to the court record you were convicted [emphasis added] on
September 16, 2014 for: drvng unr infl alc/drugs/intox subs I.C. 49-324 in the court of: MT."3
AAR p. 2. In other words, nothing in the 'Notice of Suspension' indicates that Warner's license
was suspended based on a failed test, the sole basis for a license suspension pursuant to LC. §
18-8002A. Moreover, the hearing officer concluded that "Idaho Code, section 18-8005(e)
provides that the driving privileges shall be suspended for a period of one (1) year with
absolutely no driving privileges of any kind allowed during that period." Id. at 27. The hearing
officer made no reference or finding in regard to LC. § 18-8002A. The State may not now raise
LC. § l 8-8002A as a basis for the suspension on appeal.
11.

More importantly, assuming the Department was able to raise this issue on appeal,

notwithstanding their failure to raise this issue earlier, there has been no evidence presented that
the requirements of LC. § 18-8002(A) were met by the peace officers and/or the Department in
this case. Specifically, there has been no showing that Warner was advised pursuant to section
l 8-8002A(2).
The fact that section l 8-8002A requires every Idaho peace officer and/or the Department
to follow certain procedures before a person's license can be suspended administratively may

3

I.C. § 49-324 does not specifically instruct the Department on the length of suspension but instead implicitly
requires them to refer to other statutes pertaining to the offense, in this case I.C. §§ 18-8002A and 18-8005. As
already stated the notice does not refer to !.C. § 18-8002A. It also does not refer to I.C. § 18-8005, the other
instructive statute for the imposition of a license suspension in this case. However, the notice makes clear that the
suspension is based on a conviction in Montana, not a failed test, making I.C. 18-8005 the controlling statute in this
case because it enumerates the specific penalties for a person found guilty (convicted) of a DUI in Idaho.

5
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also support the Petitioner's Equal Protection argument. These requirements, although most
likely easy to fulfill by peace officers, lead this Court to believe that administrative license
suspensions pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A are not as automatic as the Department would have this
Court believe. What if the peace officer fails to advise or misadvises a person during evidentiary
testing? What if the calibration on the testing equipment does not comply with the Department's
requirements? In all situations where the Department cannot suspend a driver's license upon the
failure of an evidentiary test (or refusal for that matter), this Court presumes that any license
suspension stems solely from the conviction and judgment entered by the court. As a result,
regardless of whether it was a person's fifth DUI or first DUI, the Court is bound by the
maximum penalties as stated in I.C. § 18-8005. Any person that bargains with the prosecutor to
plead guilty to a first offense DUI receives the benefit of that bargain, and a license suspension
only as directed in section 18-8005(1 )(d).
The Department cannot use LC. §I8-8002A as a basis for their argument that Warner's
license should be suspended for a period of one year.

2. Without the benefit ofl.C. § 18-8002A to suspend Warner's license for 1 year, can
the Department apply the penalties for a second offense DUI pursuant to I.C. § 188005(e) regardless of the form of the conviction?
Idaho Code section 49-324 gives the department the authority to suspend an Idaho
resident's driver's license upon committing an offense in another state. Specifically it reads:
49-324. Suspending resident's license and privileges upon conviction,
administrative action or court order in another state or jurisdiction. - The
6
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department shall suspend, disqualify or revoke the driver's license or privilege of
any resident of this state or the privilege of a nonresident to operate a motor
vehicle in this state upon receiving notice of the conviction, administrative action
or court order of that person in another state or jurisdiction of an offense which,
committed in this state would be grounds for the suspension, disqualification or
revocation of the driver's license and privileges of the driver. The department
shall forward a certified or electronic transfer to the national driver register.

In Warner's case, the suspension arose when the Department received notice of her DUI
conviction in Montana. Warner argues that because it was a conviction for a first offense DUI,
the administrative suspension cannot be any longer than she would have received had she been
convicted and sentenced for a first offense DUI in Idaho rather than in Montana. The
Department argues that Warner committed a DUI and the number of prior DUI's within the most
recent 10 year period only acts to enhance the penalty for the offense of DUI. Moreover the
Department argues that Warner's interpretation of the statute provides her a free bite.
1.

What is the intent and/or purpose ofl.C. 49-324?
This may seem basic, but this Court believes the legislative intent of this statute is to give

the Department the authority to suspend an Idaho resident's driver's license when they commit
offenses in other states that, if committed in Idaho, would lead to a mandatory suspension. In
other words, if an Idaho resident commits an offense in another state and that offense, if
committed in Idaho, requires a license suspension, then the Department is authorized to suspend
the resident's driver's license as if the offense had been committed in Idaho. There is nothing in
this statute that gives the Department discretion to assume what would have happened had the

7
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offense been committed in Idaho or to review their records to impose a greater suspension than
mandated or required had the offense been committed

Idaho.

4

The parties by and iarge agree with this interpretation of the statute but disagree whether
it is the actual conviction or simply the offense of DUI that authorizes the Department to suspend
Warner's license. In other words, the Department argues there is no distinction in Idaho between
first and subsequent DUI offenses; the only distinction comes in another statute pertaining to the
penalty that might be imposed - I.C. § 18-8005. However, the argument here pertains only to
the penalty that can be imposed, not whether or not Warner received a DUI. Moreover, there is
great degree of prosecutorial discretion in terms of what offense was committed and what the
conviction enters for. This includes the ability of the prosecutor to bargain for a plea to reckless
driving regardless of the number of prior DUI offenses. The question to be answered then is:
what penalty would have definitively been imposed based on the conviction, not what penalty
could have or probably would have been imposed if Warner received this DUI while driving in
Idaho.
ii.

How long would Warner's license suspension be if the offense had occurred in
Idaho?

This is a relatively straight forward question when the basic facts are examined. Warner
had (1) received a prior DUI in the previous 10 years, (2) tested at a blood alcohol content of

4

As discussed above in section (l)(ii) a license suspension pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A is not automatic or definite.
On the other hand a conviction for a DUI mandates the court impose a license suspension for some period of time
depending on the conviction.

8
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less than what is required for an aggravated DUI in Idaho, (3) pied guilty and was
sentenced to a first offense DUI as evidenced by the amended criminal complaint (despite being
originaliy charged with a second), and (4) there has been no evidence showing that I.C. § 188002A was complied with by the Department/state; therefore a license suspension pursuant to
that statute cannot be upheld. Importantly this suspension is based on the notice of conviction
and/or court order, neither of which imposed a license suspension of any length oftime. 5
While the Department places utmost importance on the fact that W amer had been
convicted of a DUI in the last 10 years, this Court believes the Department would have no
statutory basis under the same circumstances to suspend Warner's license for one year, without
I.C. § I8-8002A, had this offense been committed and conviction entered in Idaho. 6 Moreover,
without section l 8-8002A, this Court cannot find any statutory authority for the Department to
administratively suspend a person's license convicted of a DUI in Idaho provided the Court
imposes the proper penalty at sentencing. 7 Instead the sentencing Court would be limited to the

5

Presumably had the Idaho Department of Transportation received notice of a license suspension pursuant to a
Montana Court Order or an administrative order from the Montana Department of Transportation, the Idaho
Department could give full faith and credit to that suspension/order regardless of the length. For example, if
Montana orders a one year license suspension for all first offense DUls, and there was no argument that it was
actually a second offense DUI (as there is in this case), the Idaho DOT could suspend a person's license for 1 year.
Idaho would not be required to decrease the length of suspension to 90 days and allow the person to drive in all
states except Montana after 90 days. In other words, people are subject to the laws and penalties of the state
they are in and Idaho is in no position to tell other states that they are wrong. Here there was no license
suspension ordered by Montana for an offense that would carry a mandatory suspension in Idaho and therefore
the Idaho DOT is permitted to enter its own pursuant to I.C. § 49-326.
6
This is assuming that Warner would have been able to bargain with an Idaho prosecutor for a first offense DUI.
This type of bargain frequently occurs throughout Idaho between DUI offenders and prosecutors for any number
of reasons regardless of whether the Department has suspended a person's driver's license pursuant to LC. § 188002A.
7
1.C. § 49-326(1)(a) appears to provide authority for an administrative suspension if the Court fails to impose a
mandatory license suspension at sentencing. However nothing in this statute gives the Department discretion to
count the number of prior DUl's and suspend a driver's license based on the Department's records. Instead the

9
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license suspension enumerated in section 18-8005 for the crime to which the person pled
guilty regardless of how many prior DUI's the Idaho driver had received in the preceding 10 year
period. The prosecutor has the discretion to strike any prior convictions from their complaint in
the course of bargaining for a guilty plea Therefore the offense committed depends entirely on
the conviction. This Court cannot conceive that the intent of the Idaho legislature is to allow the
Department, after receiving notice of an Idaho DUI conviction, to subsequently review their own
records and impose a separate administrative license suspension based on their review instead of
based on the form of the conviction. Likewise, the Department must honor the bargain reached
in the out-of-state criminal case regardless of whether it is the person's second or fifth DUI.
Similarly, if a defendant successfully challenges a prior conviction, neither the Court nor
the Department can impose a sentence longer than that authorized by I.C. § 18-8005. In State v.

Halford, 124 Idaho 411,860 P.2d 27 (Ct App. 1993), a defendant entered a plea to first offense
DUI, despite two prior convictions, and the court imposed a 1 year license suspension. On
appeal, the sentenced was reversed: "We hold only that in the proper exercise of its sentencing
discretion, the trial court must confine itself to the maximum penalty for the offense to which the
defendant pled guilty." Id. at 414. It would make no sense to require a court to confine itself to
the maximum penalty for the offense to which the defendant pled guilty but to allow the
Department discretion to suspend a person's license based on a review of its records. (Once
again this is assuming, as in this case, that LC. § 18-8002A cannot be applied).

statute limits any administrative suspension to the length of time that is statutorily mandated for a given
conviction.

10
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Department argues simply that had the offense been committed in Idaho Warner
have had her license suspended for one year either pursuant to § 18-8002A or based on a
conviction for a second offense within 10 years. These are merely assumptions that, for reasons
discussed above, may or may occur. Restated simply, the prosecutor has discretion to bargain
with the offender for a plea to lesser offense8 and an administrative license suspension pursuant

to § l 8-8002A is not automatic.
The Department cannot and does not use discretion by reviewing their records when
receiving notice of Idaho convictions. Likewise, the Department cannot use discretion when
receiving notice of an out of state conviction when the statute is substantially conforming to the
Idaho statutes. The intent of the statute is to impose a license suspension for an offense
committed outside of Idaho as if the offense was committed within Idaho. If the Department was
free to use its discretion in all cases, the legislative intent of the statute would be lost. It makes
no sense to construe the Idaho statutes to allow the Department to do more than the sentencing
court can do, especially without some clear legislative authority. In this case, the Department
must confine Warner's license suspension to the maximum penalty for the offense to which
Warner pled guilty pursuant to§ 18-8005. That is a first offense DUL

Conclusion

Warner pied guilty in Montana to a first offense DUL The maximum license suspension
that can be imposed for a first offense DUI is enumerated in I.C. § 18-8005(1)(e). Warner's
8

A DUI can be amended to a lesser DUI (by striking prior DUls from the complaint) or even to a reckless driving
depending on the circumstances and the prosecutor. The offense committed is not the offense for which a driver,
or any criminal, is cited for, but the crime to which they are found guilty of or plead guilty to.

11
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license shall be suspended for thirty (30) days absolutely and she shall have restricted privileges
the following sixty (60) days. Any additional suspension exceeds the maximum permitted.
DATED this

:2Sday of June 2015.
By:RO~

District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Deputy Clerk for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that on the -2di;;__ day of June
5. have filed the original and caused to be served a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing document:

Andrew Parnes, Esq.
Attorney at Law
PO Box 5988
Ketchum, ID 83340
aparnes@rnindspring.com

_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
_ Telecopy
.L{ Email

Timothy Stover
Special Deputy Attorney General
905 Shoshone St. N.
PO Box 1428
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1428

_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
_ Telecopy
j_Email

w1'S@;m~1(Nol~(9,w.~

u

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
Susan Jane Warner,
Petitioner,
vs.

)
) Case No. CV-2014-784
)
) ORDER OF REMAND TO IDAHO
) DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
)

State of Idaho Department of
Transportation,

)

)
)

Respondent

)

The above- entitled matter having come before the Court on appeal from an agency
determination made by the Idaho Dept. of Transportation, and the Court having rendered its Decision
on Appeal,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER that this matter is remanded to the Idaho Dept.
of Transportation, with instructions to shorten the period of Warner's driver's license suspension in
conformity with the Decision on Appeal.

DATED this

i_ day of July, 2015.
By:

~~
ROBERTELEE
District Court Judge
1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

_1__

I, Deputy Clerk for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that on the
day of July
5. I have filed the original and caused to be served a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing document:
Andrew Parnes, Esq.
Attorney at Law

PO Box 5988
Ketchum, ID 83340
aparnes@mindspring.com

Timothy Stover
Special Deputy Attorney General
905 Shoshone St. N.
PO Box 1428
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1428

_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
T;,Telecopy
4Email

_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
Telecopy
J{Email

\viS€, /YIAflj l Va flt<j-lftW ·Ulrl..

~

Deputy Clerk
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ANDREW PARNES,
#4110
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North
Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187

P.M

JUL O9 2015
JoLynn Dr8/il6, Clerk District
Court Blaine Coun , Idaho

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAThTE

SUSAN JANE WARNER,
Petitioner,

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2014-784

:tv1E1v10RANDUM OF A TTOR.i"t\JEY
FEES AND COSTS

COMES NOW, Petitioner, Susan Jane Warner, by and through her attorney of
record, Andrew Parnes, and submits this Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 and Rule 54(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

I.
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
12/4/2014
01/02/2015

Filing Fee: Petition
Transcript Fee
Total

$221.00
$ 75.00
$296.00
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II.
ATTORNEY FEES
Petitioner respectfully requests attorney fees in the amount of $3,410 pursuant to
Idaho Code § 12-117 and Rule 54(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This
represents 12.4 hours at $275 per hour for work only on the proceedings in this matter.

TOTAL FEES AND COSTS:

$3,410

DATED this Gt~ay of July, 2015.

a~1.12

~wPrune~
Attorney for Petitioner
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Parnes

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

3_ day of July, 2015, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method
marked herein:
TIMOTHY J. STOVER
Special Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
905 Shoshone Street North
P.O. Box 1428
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1248

'f..

By faxing a copy to his office at 208-736-9929.
By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the
post office at Ketchum, Idaho.

Emi~c.H--:::::-

MEMORAND{JM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

3

108

07-16-' 15 10:54 FROM-WFS

.

LC

208-736-9929

T- 095 P0002/ 0005 F-919

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
Timothy J. Stover
Special Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
905 Shoshone Street North
P.O. Box 1428

Twin Falls, ID 83303-1428
Telephone: (208) 736-9900
Facsimile: (208) 736-9929

ISB #4842

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

*****
SUSAN JANE WARNER,

Petitioner,

)
)
)
)
)

V.

)

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.

)
)

Case No. CV 2014-784

OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS

)
)

COMES NOW the Respondent, the State of Idaho Department of Transportation
("Department"), by and through its counsel of record, Special Deputy Attorney General Timothy J.
Stover, and hereby submits its Objection to Petitioner's Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs as

follows:
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I.
INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, Susan Jane Warner, filed a Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs, seeking an
award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 and Rule 54(e). Warner's request
does not satisfy Idaho Code Section 12-117 or Rule 54(e) and therefore should be denied.
II.

ARGUMENT
l.

Warner's request does not satisfy Rule 54(e).

Warner's request under Rule 54(e) is untimely. 1 Rule 54(e) requires a party to submit an

affidavit of the attorney in conjunction with the memorandum within fourteen days of the judgment.
"[F]ailure to verify a memorandum of costs, including attorney fees, renders it subject to timely
objection.... " Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 883, 693 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Ct. App. 1984). As no
verification accompanied the memorandum of costs and fees, such memorandum is untimely.
Even if Warner's request had been verified, it would not satisfy Rule 54(e). Rule 54(e)(3)
provides the factors the Court is to consider in awarding fees. However, Warner presents no
information as to any one of those factors. "We believe it is incumbent upon a party seeking attorney
fees to present sufficient information for the court to consider factors as they specifically relate to the

prevailing party or parties seeking fees." Hackettv. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261,264, 706 P.2d 1372, 1375
(Ct. App. 1985). "Thus, because a court must consider all of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors before awarding
attorney fees, those fees are properly denied where the party claiming them does not provide the
information necessary to permit the court to evaluate all of the factors." Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526,
531,284 P.3d 970, 975 (2012). Additionally, Warner's failure to address those factors prohibits the

1 The Department notes that Warner is seeking costs and fees under Rule 54(e). However, Rule 54(e) only addresses
attorney's fees, not costs. Warner does not state under which rule she is seeking costs.

OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 2
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Department from being able to present adequate responses. Since Warner failed to provide facts or

2. Warner's request does not satisfy ldaho Code Section 12-117.
Warner's request is based upon Idaho Code Section 12-117. Warner does not provide any
explanation as to how Idaho Code Section 12-1 i 7 appiies. Idaho Code Section 12-117(1) states,
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a
state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, political
subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses,
if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or

law.
(Emphasis added).
The. Department did not act ''without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Very simply, the
Department submitted a decision from the Honorable D. Duff McKee that was directly on point to the
present case. In Judge McKee's decision, he noted that there was no distinction between first and
second DUI offenses in the basic statutes, but the distinction came with regards to the penalties that
could be imposed. Judge McKee stated, "The authority granted by [Idaho Code Section 49-324] is not
limited or connected to any sentencing provision in the foreign state." He also stated that the fact that
the foreign jurisdiction called it a "first offense" DUI did not "limit the administrative authority of the
ITD in an administrative license suspension proceeding upon learning of the circumstance of
Baumgart's second DUI conviction within ten years."
The Department also submitted case law stating that administrative driver's license suspensions
were for public safety-not considered punishments--along with a case where the Idaho Supreme
Court determined that the "offense" in a DUI case is the DUI itself, not the number ofDUis a person
may have. Considering the language of Idaho Code Section 49-424 focuses on "offense[s]" and not

OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 3
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second offense
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of conviction," the Department's position that Warner's offense
ten

Montana

requiring a one-year license suspension was well-rooted in and

supp011ed by Idaho law. Therefore, the Department did not act "without a reasonable basis in law or
fact" and Idaho Code Section 12-117 is not applicable. 2

HI.
CONCULSION

Warner seeks an award of costs and fees under Idaho Code Section 12-117 and Rule 54(e).
Those bases were not satisfied and therefore the request must be denied.
DATED this 161h day of July, 2015.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the 161h day of July, 2015, he caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following manner:
ANDREW PARNES
671 First Avenue North
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, Id 83340

(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(x) Facsimile
(208) 726~1187

2 The Department notes that Idaho Code Section 12-117 provides that fees and reasonable expenses may be awarded
to the prevailing party. There is no mention of costs. lnasmuch as that code section's language can be interpreted to
include costs, the Department's argument above applies. To the extent that it does not, Warner does not provide a
statute indicating that costs may be awarded in this case.
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho

Jolynn Drage, Clerlc District
Court Blaine Coun , Idaho

Timothy J. Stover ISB #4842
Special Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
905 Shoshone Street North
P.O. Box 1428
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1248
Telephone: (208) 736-9900
Facsimile: (208) 736-9929
E-mail: tjs@magicvalleylaw.com
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
*****
SUSAN JANE WARNER,
)
) Case No. CV 2014-784
)
Petitioner/Appellee,
) NOTICE OF APPEAL
)

V.

)

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent/Appellant.

(No filing fee pursuant to I.C. §67-2301)

)
)
)
)

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED-APPELLEE, AND HER ATTORNEY, ANDREW PARNES, AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellant, STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION, by and through its attorney of record, Timothy l Stover, appeals against the
NOTICE OF APPEAL - l
113

above named Appellee by and through his attorney of record. Andrew Parnes, to the Idaho Supreme
from the Decision on Appeal entered in the above-entitled action on June 25, 2015, and the Order
of Remand to Idaho Department of Transportation entered on July 1, 2015, in the Fifth Judicial District
of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Blaine, Case No. CV 2014-784 (together the ""District
Court Decision"), Honorable Robert Elgee presiding. The District Court Decision was the decision on
judicial review of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order dated October
31, 2014, issued by the Idaho Department of Transportation's Administrative Hearing Examiner,
Michael B. Howell, File No. MT TK.1400262 ("Hearing Officer Decision").
2.

That the Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the District

Court Decision described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Idaho
Appellant Rule ll(t).
3.

The following is a preliminary statement of the issues which the Appellant intends to

assert in the appeal. Such preliminary list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellant from
asserting other issues on appeal.
a

Did the District Court err by determining that the Department could not suspend

Warner's driver's license for a period of one year?
b.

Was the Hearing Officer Decision in violation of constitutional provisions or

Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3)(a)?
c.

Did the Hearing Officer Decision exceed the statutory authority granted to the

Department of Transportation?
d.

Was the Hearing Officer Decision arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of

discretion?

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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4.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No.

5.

The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's

transcript in hard copy: Oral Argument on Appeal held before the District Court on May 4, 2015.
6.

The Appellant requests the following additional documents be included in the Clerk's

Record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.
a.

The transcript of the evidentiary hearing before the Department of

Transportation hearing officer;

7.

b.

A copy of the Amended Agency Record.

c.

A copy of Respondent's Brief.

d.

A copy of Respondent's Augmentation of Brief.

I certify:
a.

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter of who a

transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Susan P. Israel, CSR No. 244

P.O. Box 1379
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
b.

That the reporter has been paid directly the estimated fee for preparation of

the transcript.
c.

That no appellate filing fee is required for agencies of the State of Idaho
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-2301.

d.

That no fee is required for the preparation of the clerk's record pursuant to
Idaho Code Section 67-2301.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
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e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to

Rule

DATED this 16th day of July, 2015.

.-l'tiiiothy J. Stover

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the 16th day of July, 2015, he caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the following manner:
Andrew Parnes
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187
E-mail: apames@mindspring.com
Susan Israel
P.O. Box 1379
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

(x ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
------....
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Timothy J. Stover
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ANDREW PARNES, ISB
Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North

JUL 2 7 2015

l

Jolynn_ CJrage, a.rlc District
Coitrt Bltllne CoJ!!!!Y: lflaho

Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83 340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SUSAN JANE WARNER,
Petitioner,

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPART1\1ENT

OF TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.

)

Case No. CV-2014-784

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW
PARNES IN SUPPORT OF
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S
OBJECTIONS REGARDING FEES
AND COSTS

)

)
)

I, Andrew Parnes, declare as follows:
1.

I am the attorney for the Petitioner in the above-entitled action.

2.

I represented Petitioner in the proceedings before the Idaho Department of

Transportation (Department).

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW P.4.RNES IN SUPPORT OF RESPONSE TO
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS REGARDING FEES AND COSTS
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l.

Because the Department denied Petitioner's request to reduce her license
suspension to the ninety days permitted under Idaho law

a c.onviction

a first time

DUI, I had to file the instant Petition in District Court.
4.

The filing fee for this Petition was $221 and I was required to pay the

Department $75 to obtain the transcript of the Department hearing.

5.

My hourly rate in this case was $275 per hour, which is a reasonable hourly

rate in Blaine ColUlty Idaho.
6.

My preparation of the Petition included the necessity of reviewing the

record and researching both the law and constitutional issues. I spent 3 .5 hours preparing
the petition.
7.

Because I had spent some time during the proceedings in the Department, I

was able to prepare the brief filed in this case in 3.8 hours. J\..1y Reply Brief was prepared
in 2.6 Hours.
8.

As Respondent filed an augmentation to its Brief shortly before the hearing

in this matter, I had to spend additional time obtaining and reviewing briefing in that prior
case. That time and oral argument in the case took an additional 2.5 hours.
9.

The total time for attorneys fees is a reasonable total of 12.4 hours, which

totals $3,410 at the rate of $275 per hour.

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW PARNES IN SUPPORT OF RESPONSE TO
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS REGARDING FEES AND COSTS
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I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law

the State of Idaho that the

tor,egomg is true and correct.
DATED this

zriy

of July, 2015.

wPames

D

Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the_ day of July, 2015, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method
marked herein:

TIMOTHY J. STOVER
Special Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Transportation Department
905 Shoshone Street North
P.O. Box 1428
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1248

\/J

By faxing a copy to his office at 208-736-9929.
By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the
post office at Ketchum, Idaho.

Emily Dion
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ANDREW PARNES, ISB #41
Attorney at Law
1 First Avenue North
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Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JCDIClAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SUSAN JANE WARNER,
Petitioner,

)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPART.l\1ENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2014-784

PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS
REGARDING FEES AND COSTS

)
)

Petitioner, Susan Warner, by and through cowisel of record, hereby files this
Response to Respondent's Objections to Memorandum of Fees and Costs.

1.

The Request for Fees and Costs was Timely

This Court filed its memorandum decision on June 25, 2015, and its Order re
Remand on July 1, 2015. Petitioner filed her request for fees and costs on July 9, 2015,

PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS REGARDING

FEES AND COSTS
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r.

the Courf s decision and order. Therefore, this Court must reject

Respondent's argument that the request was untimely.
2.

The Request was Sufficient under the Rules

The request set forth the specific costs and the proper basis for the fees.
Respondent contends that because the request was not verified, they must be denied. But

the case relied upon by Respondent does not support this assertion. In that case, the party
seeking fees submitted an affidavit before the hearing on fees, as Petitioner is doing in
this case. (See, attached Affidavit of Andrew Parnes.) Thus, in Hackett v. Streeter, 109
Idaho 261 (Ct. App 1985), any failure to file an affidavit at the time the request was
initially made was not fatal to the claim for fees. Therefore, this Court can consider an
affidavit of counsel prior to the hearing on the request for fees. 1
3.

Petitioner's Request Satisfies the Statute

Petitioner is entitled to fees and costs because the positions taken by the
Department were not made upon a reasonable basis in fact or la\V. Petitioner throughout
the proceedings acknowledged that the Department could suspend her license for a first
offense. At the Department level, the sole basis for rejection of this argument was that
Idaho Code § 18-8005 permitted the suspension for one year.

Petitioner's counsel did not set a hearing on the request immediately in order to
assess any response. By separate pleading, that hearing is now being set and noticed to
Respondent.
1

PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS REG•.\.RDING
FEES AND COSTS
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However, on appeal, the Department asserted

009

F

the first time that :tv1s. Warner's

could be suspended for one year under the provisions of Administrative License
Suspensions set forth in Idaho Code § l 8-8002A. This Court rejected that argument first
under the waiver doctrine as the Department had not asserted this in the hearings below.
In addition, this Court found that the Department had made no showing that the pre-

conditions for suspension under this section had been met under the facts of this case.
Furthermore, the facts demonstrate that had the Department sought to suspend Ms.
Warner's privileges under this section, the maximum suspension would have been a
ninety day suspension, because the ALS suspension had been rescinded after her first
arrest for DUI in Idaho. See Record at 9. Therefore, this argument was neither grounded
in law or fact.
Finally, Respondent argues solely that another District Judge's decision, not
binding on this Court, justifies the denial of request for fees in this case. However,
Respondent's Brief filed in this case on March 30, 2015, did not cite or rely on this other
opinion. Respondent did not cite to this other opinion until April 22, 2015, three weeks
after Petitioner filed her Reply Brief. Respondent's initial briefing therefore did not rely

on that court's opinion. Indeed, because Respondent filed that augmentation less than
two weeks before oral argument, Petitioner's counsel was required to complete additional
work to demonstrate that the parties in that other case had not presented Judge

PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS REGARDING
FEES AND COSTS
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McKee with the full scope of arguments, including the constitutional issues raised in this
case. 2
4.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above and in the request for fees and costs, and based on
the arguments to be presented at the hearing on this request, it is respectfully requested
that this Court grant the Petitioner reasonable fees and costs in this action.

DATED this

l-t&day of July, 2015.

{k~
~es

Attorney for Petitioner

Because this Court did not accept Respondent)s statutory arguments, the decision
issued in this case did not need to reach the constitutional issued raised by the
Department's unwarranted interpretation of the statute.
2

PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS REGARDING
FEES AND COSTS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the )...1-"day of July, 201 I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method
marked herein:
TIMOTHY J. STOVER
Special Deputy Attorney Generai
Idaho Transportation Department
905 Shoshone Street North

P.O. Box 1428
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1248

_:.::£

By faxing a copy to his office at 208-736-9929.

By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the
post office at Ketchum, Idaho.

Ey;/; Q_
y
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1

Attorney at Law
671 First Avenue North

Post Office Box 5988
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 726-1010
Facsimile: (208) 726-1187
Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COTJRT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

SUSAN JANE WARNER,

Case No. CV-2014~784

Petitioner,

)
)
)

NOTICE OF HEARING

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMEm
OF TRANSPORTATION,

)
)
)
)

Date: August 24, 2015
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Judge: Hon. Robert J. Elgee

)

Respondent.

)
)
)

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Petitioner, Susan Jane Warner, by and

through her attorney of record, sets her hearing regarding attorney fees before the
Honorable Robert J. Elgee on August 24, 2015 at the hour of 10:30 a.m.
DATED this 28th day of July, 2015.

r· ( 0
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An~Parnes
Attorney for Petitioner

NOTICE OF HEARING
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theBt day of July, 2015, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method

marked herein:
TIMOTHY J. STOVER
Special Deputy Attorney Generai
Idaho Transportation Department
905 Shoshone Street North
P.O. Box 1428
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1248

':f_

By faxing a copy to his office at 208-736~9929.

By depositing a copy of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at the
post office at Ketchum, Idaho.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

COURT MINUTES
CV-2014-0000784
Susan Jane Warner vs. State Ofldaho Department Of Transportation
Hearing type: Motion for Attorney fees and Costs
Hearing date: 8/24/2015
Time: 10:29 am
Judge: Robert J. Elgee
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg
Court reporter: Susan Israel
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby
Tape Number: DC
Party: State Of Idaho Department Of Transportation, Attorney: Timothy Stover
Party: Susan Warner, Attorney: Andrew Parnes
Counter#
10.33
Mr. Parnes present, Mr. Stover present by phone.
Court introduces the case.
10.34
Mr. Parnes addresses the Motion for Attorney fees and costs.
10.38
Mr. Stover responds- the memorandum was not verified and was not filed
timely.
10.42
Court inquires.
Mr. Parnes responds.
Mr. Stover responds.
10.51
10.52
Court inquires about the unreasonableness of the department
Mr. Stover responds.
10.53
Court takes the matter under advisement and will issue a written decision.
10.54
Recess

COURT MINUTES 1
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Jolynn Drage, Clerlc District
_. . Court BlainP t:nantv ld'lho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BLAINE COUNTY

SUSAN JANE WARNER,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: CV-2014-784

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
ATTORNEY FEES

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter came to the district court on appeal from the decision of a hearing officer
affirming the Department of Transportation's (hereinafter ''the Department") suspension of
Warner's driving privileges. Warner did not contest the fact that the Department could suspend
her license upon a conviction for an out-of-state DUI. Rather, Warner contested the length of the
suspension imposed by the Department, arguing it had no authority to impose a one year
suspension. This court entered a written Decision on Appeal on the 25th day of June, 2015,
reversing the decision of the hearing officer. The matter was remanded to the Department with
instructions to shorten the period of Warner's suspension. The Department appealed that ruling
on July 20, 2015.
Warner submitted an application for attorney fees on July 9, 2015. The Department filed
an Objection to Petitioner's Memorandum of Attorney Fees a.11.d Costs on July 16, 2015. Oral
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Court on August 24,
took

on the attorney

at which

under advisement.
RELEVANT FACTS

Warner's initial Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs was not verified or supported
by affidavit. The Department has objected, citing Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878 (Ct.
App.1984) and Hackett v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261, (Ct.App.1985). The Department also
contends that Warner has not provided sufficient information to the Court for the Court to
evaluate the required factors enumerated in I.R.C.P 54(e)(3). Finally, the Department submits
that, although the Court ruled against the Department on appeal, this Court cannot and should not
find that the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law as required by Idaho
Code§ 12-117.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Court will take the last issue first.

Proceedings on Appeal.
The Court agrees with Warner that the Department raised arguments on appeal before the
district court that were not raised before the hearing officer, and that the Department found a
decision of Judge McKee late in the process that required extra work of Warner's counsel.
However, as pointed out by counsel for the Department, the Department prevailed before the
hearing officer, and was defending itself on appeal, not prosecuting or re-presenting a dubious
argument on appeal, where the Department had already lost before the hearing officer. In order
to award Warner attorney fees on appeal, the Court would have to find that the Department's
position on appeal, where it was defending itself, was without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
First, even if all the Department did on appeal was to argue that the hearing officer had decided
the issue below correctly, it would be difficult if not impossible for the Court to conclude that the
Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Second, in order for the Court to
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attorney
to

of the Department once the case was on appeal, this Court would

that the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law in part

arguing issues not presented below, or that added to Warner's workload. The Court is not aware
of any authority, and has been directed to none, which allows the Court to look piecemeal at
different arguments raised by a party at different phases of the administrative appeal process and
to then award attorney fees for arguing over discrete and separate issues. In other contexts
(e.g.-awards of fees pursuant to LC. §12-121 ), the appellate courts of Idaho have frowned upon
such awards. See, e.g., Management Catalysts v. Turbo West Corpac, Inc,. 119 Idaho 626,630
( 1990) (holding that in cases with multiple claims and defenses, it is not appropriate to segregate
them to determine which were or were not frivolously defended or pursued.) Third, the
Department on appeal raised some cogent objections to Warner's claim, such as the request for
attorney fees was not timely or properly verified.
In this Court's view, Idaho Code §12-117 requires the Court to view the case on an
overall basis, and determine if the Department acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law
considering the totality of the circumstances of the case. The Court cannot find the Department
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, considering the case on an overall basis, in
defending itself before the district court on appeal.
Department's Position at the Outset.
The other arguable alternative for a finding that the Department acted without a
reasonable basis in law or fact is the argument that the Department took an unreasonable position
in law or fact at the outset of the case, and has persisted in maintaining it. Under this analysis,
Mr. Parnes argues that whatever the Department did or did not do on appeal before the district
court is irrelevant. This argument, in other words, is that the Department should be responsible
for all fees, even on appeal, if the Department took or maintained an unreasonable position early
on that then required Warner to incur fees throughout that never should have been necessary.
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argument has merit, but only if the

can find that

Department's position has been

a reasonable basis in fact or law from the beginning.

It must be noted that there are no serious or material facts in issue. The facts are fairly
straightforward. Warner got convicted of a DUI in Montana, and had a prior conviction for DUI
in Idaho as shown by the Idaho Department of Transportation's records. The Montana court did
not suspend Warner's license. The question is whether the Department can consult its own
records in determining whether a driver convicted in another state has a prior offense, and use
that in determining the length of the suspension, or whether the Department is bound by the
record of conviction from the other state. Two Idaho statutes have been implicated, those being
Idaho Code§ 49-324 and Idaho Code §49-326(l)(a) and (e). In fairness to the Department, Idaho
Code §49-326(1) enables the Department to consult its own records. The question is how far and
to what extent the Department is able to do so. Are they bound solely by the foreign judgment, or
is the Department able to consider the foreign judgment as well as their own records? The Court
has construed Idaho Code§ 49-326(1)(a) and (e) to mean that the Department does not have
discretion to consider its own records, and make a determination that its own records, together

with a record of a conviction, court order, or administrative action, permits the Department to
come up with a license suspension length that combines the two. The statutes do not say that.
Although the statute says the Department can consider its own records, whatever the Department
considers has to provide sufficient evidence to show that the driver has committed an offense for
which mandatory revocation or suspension is required (that has not been demonstrated here), or
has, under subsection (e ), committed an offense in another state or jurisdiction, as evidenced by a
conviction, court order, or administrative action, which if committed in Idaho would be grounds
for suspension. This subsection of the statute is more particularly tailored to present
circumstances, and should govern in the event of any conflict with any other subsection. So,
according to the plain language of the statute, although the Department can consult its records to
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see if they make the showing required, the subsections provide specifically what the record must
what is to

considered. The statute does not allow the Department to combine its

records of other driver activity with the evidence of a conviction or record of the foreign offense
in order to come up with the Department's own idea of how long the suspension should be for.
The long and short of this analysis is that it was not unreasonable for the Department to
take the position that the statute did allow it to consider its own records in making the
determination of the proper length of suspension. Although the Court disagreed, that does not, by
itself, mean that the Department took an unreasonable position from the outset, and refused to let
go of their untenable position.
The Court concludes the Department has not acted without a reasonable basis in law or
fact, and Warner's application for an award of attorney fees and costs on that basis is denied.

DATED this .Jj_ day of September, 2015.

RoOOrtJ~~

District Judge
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